OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 
Shelf 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



884 



Outlines of Psychology, 



SUCCINCTLY PRESENTED. 



WITH 



ILLUSTRATIONS AND A CHART. 



TOGETHER WITH AN 



ALLEGORICAL ILLUSTRATION 

OF THE WHOLE. 







Know thyself.' 



CHAUTAUQUA ASSEMBLY. 

1884. 







<$£ 



N k\ 



cu^to 



Copyright 1884, by the 
CHAUTAUOUA LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC CIRCLE, 

New York. 



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AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 



IN the general plan and in the divisions adopted in 
this outline, the author has followed chiefly the 
" Psychology " of Rev. O. S. Munsell, D.D., published 
by D. Appleton & Co., New York, of which work free 
use has also been made in other ways, especially under 
the head of the Sensibilities. 

I must content myself with a general acknowledg- 
ment of incalculable obligation to the master-workers 
of the past in this department, for it would be impos- 
sible, and profitless, if possible, to refer to their original 
sources, thoughts, illustrations, and perhaps even felic- 
itous expressions, which have been absorbed into the 
mind from many writers and are now given out again 
unconsciously as its own. 

Novelty has neither been sought nor avoided. The 
object has been to present for those wfro may possibly 
pursue the subject no further a systematic outline 



Author's Preface. 



of the science of Psychology with a few applications 
of practical importance, and this end the author has 
sought by the most direct and effective methods at his 
command. Profuseness of illustration throughout, sum- 
maries of each chapter, and an outline chart of the 
whole, together with an allegorical recapitulation de- 
signed to imprint by its picturesque form what might 
be otherwise less easily retained by younger readers, 
constitute the chief peculiarities of the work, and will, 
it is hoped, contribute to its usefulness, 

The author can only hope that he may have suffi- 
ciently succeeded in his effort after naturalness of 
method, clearness of statement, and aptness of illustra- 
tion to convey to the intelligent reader, though not an 
adequate, at least a reasonably clear and distinct, idea 
of the subject. 



The Author. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Introductory 7 

II. The Tabernacle op the Flesh 10 

III. A Look Within 13 

IV. A Second Look 16 

V. Intellections — How we Think — The First Step — Percep- 
tion 17 

VI. The Second Step — Conception 22 

VII. The Third Step— Beliefs 29 

VIII. How we Feel 34 

IX. Conscience 38 

X. Volition — How we Determine 42 

XI. Conclusion 53 

A Traveler's Story 55 

DIAGRAMS. 
♦ 

The Cerebro-Spinal System 11 

Outline Summary 50, 51 

Brain City 58 



OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY 



CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTORY. 



EVERY BODY has a soul. It thinks and feels and de- 
cides. It dwells in the body, and through it expresses 
its thoughts and works, its purposes, yet it is utterly unlike 
the body which it inhabits., It is invisible. No surgeon's 
scalpel has ever laid it bare, no microscope has ever dis- 
closed its hiding place. It is imponderable. It causes not 
the most delicate balance to turn " in the estimation of a 
hair." The body active with energy, the eye beaming with 
intelligence, reveal the presence of the soul within, yet that 
body weighs just so much and no more nor less, when it 
lies still, with the dull eye and nerveless arm of death. 

It is indestructible by man. Whatever He who made man 
" a living soul " may do, of men He declares they can '.* kill 
the body, and after that have no more that they can do." 
Its power extends far beyond the narrow confines of its 
home. It revisits at will the scenes of the past, and peoples 
the future with images of beauty which " eye hath not seen 
nor ear heard." It roams earth, sea, and sky, and enriches 
tself with treasures of knowledge and wisdom. 

Though in the body which we see and touch, it is not of 
it, and when death brings the summons, " then shall the dust 
return to the earth as it was : and the spirit shall return unto 
God who gave it." Yet all that the soul can do in the mate- 
rial world around us must be wrought through the meager 
one hundred and fifty pounds more or less of perishable clay 
man calls his body. This body has not the strength of the 



8 Outlines of Psychology. 

ox, the speed of the horse, nor is it armed with the tusks or 
teeth or claws of the fierce beasts around it ; it is without 
wings to cleave the air, or fins to pursue the paths of the sea ; 
yet the imperial soul within proclaims itself lord of earth 
and sea and air, and bids the body go forth to their con- 
quest, and make flesh, fish, and fowl obedient to its mandates. 
And truly what wonders hath it wrought ! The massive ele- 
phant, the sturdy ox, the fiery horse, are subdued and guided 
by its hand. The whale succumbs to its prowess, the wild 
beasts and birds flee from or fall before its skill. Even the 
elements are yoked to its triumphal car, and winds and tides 
waft it over every sea, fire and water bear it over every con- 
tinent, or turn for it the busy wheels of countless factories 
throbbing with seeming life and eager haste to minister to 
its pleasure. Earth to its toil yields up its stores of food, or, 
disemboweled, is robbed of its treasured ore and fuel, and 
the tamed lightning bears the messages of its master. 

Yes, man is master. He surveys a world of matter con- 
quered by his feeble body because directed by a mighty 
soul. Truly, there is nothing great in the world but man, 
and there is nothing great in man but soul. 

The soul is an entity, a substance possessed of attributes. 
It is not a mere influence. It is utterly distinct from matter, 
both in essence and in attributes. Soul is a unit ; matter is 
divisible. Soul is essentially active ; matter essentially pas- 
sive. Nor are soul and matter to be viewed as different 
species of some higher genus. We cannot too firmly fix in 
our minds this fundamental distinction : soul and body, mind 
and matter, are two and inconfusable now and forever. 

The soul is the " self," the "I," the personality whence 
all our thoughts and actions spring. "Know thyself" 
means pre-eminently, know thy soul. 

How can an immaterial entity dwell in my body and di- 
rect it? how can mind come in contact with muscle and 
control it ? are questions which any can ask and none can 



Introductory. 



answer. This mystery of our being is one of ten thousand 
which encompass man on every side and show him that his 
mind is finite, that it cannot comprehend all things, but must 
learn to live by faith. By faith he plants the hard, dry, 
shriveled pea, and there comes up, he knows not how, the 
luxuriant vine to yield its multiplied fruit. By faith he 
arranges copper and zinc and acid, and there is born, he 
cannot say how, the subtle force which speaks his will 
through the interposing ocean to the eastern world. And 
so how soul can move matter or be reached through matter 
the oldest sage cannot tell ; but that soul does move matter 
and that it is reached through it, that at my will my finger 
guides the pen and that my thoughts are being expressed to 
you through the medium of your eyes, the youngest child 
who reads this clearly knows. 

What are the powers and processes of the soul within ? 
How do we think and feel and will ? These are the ques- 
tions which Psychology undertakes to answer. Your text- 
book is your own mind; your apparatus the power which 
God has given you to know your own thoughts. Let us 
together enter this inner world, and for a short time study 
ourselves. For a while let us turn from the contemplation 
of what has been wrought in the world to see what that 
wondrous power is which, through such a feeble body, has 
done so much. 

We define, then : 

i. Psychology (from the Greek psyche, the soul, and logos, 
a science) is the science which treats of the phenomena of 
the embodied human soul. 

2. The soul is that which thinks and feels and wills, the 
immaterial part of the natural man.* 

* The word " natural" precludes the necessity of making the distinction 
which the author conceives to exist between soul and spirit, a distinction 
which could not be utilized in this introductory outline. See I Cor. ii, 14, 15. 
1* 



io Outlines of Psychology. 

CHAPTER II. 
THE TABERNACLE OF THE FLESH. 

THE entire structure of the human body, with its 
wondrous mechanism, as fully set forth in works on 
Physiology, is worthy of the closest study ; but it is chiefly 
the nerve-system through which the soul comes in contact 
with the external world. This system, centering in the 
brain and extending to every part of the body, is partially 
shown in the diagram on p. n. 

Through the nerves represented by these delicate white 
lines, the soul is kept in instant communication with every 
member. There is no grumbling tooth nor punctured finger 
but has its telegraphic nerve-line to bear its signal of inquiry 
to head-quarters in the brain, from which the soul sends 
back, through the nerves, its orders to every muscle. 

Besides this general office of the nerves to inform the soul 
of the contact of foreign bodies, and to convey its orders to 
the muscles, certain of them have other and peculiar duties. 
Thus one leading from the eye is peculiarly affected when 
light falls upon it from any object, and will then send to the 
brain an impulse which the soul knows as "Color." Another 
from the ear is not affected by light, but receives from 
motions in the air around it impressions which the soul 
names "Sound." A third, lining the nostrils, tingles only at 
the approach of "Odors;" while spread out upon the tongue 
and palate is a fourth which answers but to the impulses we 
call "Taste or savor" sweet or bitter, etc. Lastly, in the 
finger tips especially is developed a peculiar sensitiveness to 
outlines and roughnesses, called the special sense of Touch. 
Through these five lines the soul receives its information 
about the world around us, and through others leading to 
each muscle it directs every motion of the body with won- 




THE CEREBRO-SPINA.L SYSTEM. 



The Tabernacle of the Flesh. 13 

derful rapidity and precision. Thus curiously and won- 
drously is the home of the soul fitted up with appliances 
adapted to all its needs for pleasure or for conquest. 



CHAPTER III. 
A LOOK WITHIN. 



AMONG the endowments which the Creator has given us 
is the power of the soul to know its own acts and states. 
Thus we not only think, but we know that we are thinking, 
and what the character of our thoughts is. This knowledge, 
which we call Consciousness, is immediate and direct. The 
soul, as an eye-witness, testifies to its own acts and states, 
and its testimony is unimpeachable and conclusive. In fact, 
there can be no other witness of the facts of our soul-life, 
and hence the whole science of Psychology must be founded 
upon what Consciousness presents. 

Again, it is only of what is actually going on now in our 
souls that we can be truly said to be conscious. We may re- 
member past thoughts and feelings, or imagine future ones, 
but are conscious only of those real ones now transpiring in 
our souls. Moreover, it is only the actions of the soul of 
which we are conscious. Of soul quiescent Or inactive we 
can know nothing, for an inactive soul, if there be such a 
thing, is not conscious. Hence we say Consciousness gives 
us only the phenomena and not the essence of the soul ; it 
tells what the soul does, and not what it is. 

Let us now exercise this power a while. 

We sit in our country home before the blazing fire. The 
wind howls without, but the embers glow and the logs crackle 
as the bright-tongued flame darts in and out among them. 
See the fantastic figures in that mass of coals which has just 



14 Outlines of Psychology. 

fallen on the hearth; does not that one suggest' a rugged 
mountain with a ruined castle on the summit, and can't you 
see that neat little cottage nestling at the foot ? How it 
reminds me of the dear old cottage we knew in by-gone 
days, and of John and Mary who lived in it. You recollect it, 
don't you? What a bright cheery fire their home always 
had, and how delightful a circle gathered around it. The 
room was a small one, it is true ; well, let me see, I should 
say about two thirds as large as this one in which we sit, 
but it was ever so nice and cozy. 

" O yes," you reply, " I remember it well ; and that funny 
old friend of theirs who used to amuse us so during our last 

visit. Mr. , what was his name ? Strange I can't recall 

it ; B, C, D, — no, it was M ; it began with an M, I am sure. 
Martin — Moffett — Murphy — no ; strange I've forgotten it. 
Let me think ; Mab — Meb — Mib — Mob — Mub " — and I sit in 
silence for five minutes while you try to recall the missing 
name. At length you say, " Well, it's of no use ; I give it 
up ; let us turn to something else. Try one of these apples." 

Now suppose we bring in review a few of the things which 
arose in our souls while we were looking into the fire and 
talking about the distant home which one of the dying em- 
bers suggested. 

First. We saw around us the room and before us the 
glowing fire — things real and present. 

Second. We pictured to our minds a mountain, a castle, 
and a cottage, and recalled the home and fireside of a dis- 
tant friend — things unreal and abse?it. 

Third. We compared the size of our room with that of 
the remembered one, and concluded that our own was larger. 
We had many other convictions also, as that it was a good 
thing to have a comfortable home and a cozy fire, when we 
heard the wind whistling around the house. 

Now these three processes or operations of our souls, 
though in other respects different, were alike in that they 



A Look Within. 15 



all involved thinking ; so we will call them Thoughts, or, 
more strictly, Intellections. 

Fourth. We felt warm as the fire blazed up. We enjoyed 
being together, and we felt a melancholy pleasure in recall- 
ing the friends who had once formed a part of our social 
circle, but whom Providence had severed from us. These 
soul-movements we call Feelings or Sensibilities. 

Fifth. During our talk you often moved your hand, and in 
obedience to your soul's command your tongue formed 
words; then for five minutes together you bent your mind 
to the effort to recall a name, and when finally you found the 
effort fruitless, you bade it give up the search and dismissed 
the subject. These were quite different from any of the other 
soul-movements we have noticed. The fire existed before 
you and you saw it ; the faces of your friends had been seen 
by you and you recalled them ; but the motion of your hand 
or tongue, the effort of your mind to recall the name, started 
for the first time in .your own soul. And when you ceased to 
try and release your mind from the investigation, you did not 
see a release, you did not feel a release, you simply ordered 
it. These commands of the soul we call Volitions. 

Now, while ten thousand things occur every day in our 
soul-life, they may all be classed under these three heads : 
Intellections ', Sensibilities, and Volitions. 

Summary. 

I. Consciousness is the soul's power to know its own acts 
and states. fi. Immediate. 

I 2. Of the actual only. 

II. This knowledge is \ % Of the present only. 

4. Of the phenomena only, and 
^ not the essence. 

r 1. Intellections. 

III. The acts of the soul are J 2 . Sensibilities. 

[3. Volitions, 



16 Outlines of Psychology. 



CHAPTER IV. 
A SECOND LOOK. 

IF we recur to the analysis of our half-hour's soul-life, 
given in the preceding chapter, we will see that there 
were three kinds of thoughts classed together under the 
general name of Intellections. First, there was the appre- 
hension of the room and fire and company really in our 
presence. These we actually perceived, and we will name 
them Percepts. Secondly, we imagined a castle, a cottage, a 
distant home, and absent friends. These were not real, 
present things, but were merely mental images of absent ones. 
We call them Concepts. Thirdly, we made comparisons and 
came to conclusions. These convictions we will call Beliefs. 
We have, then : 

Intellections f I# Perce P ts -~ oi thin S s actual and present. 
\ 2. Concepts — of things imaginary or absent. 
^ 3. Beliefs — about the relations of things. 

Again our Feelings or Sensibilities were of two clearly dis- 
criminated kinds. Some were simply enjoyments, and did 
not look beyond themselves : as the feeling of warmth, or the 
gratitude we felt as we realized the comforts we enjoyed, or 
the sadness or pleasure of remembering old-time friends. 
Others incited us to do something. Thus our appetite for 
fruit moved us to partake of the nice apples you set before 
us, as your hospitable feelings had prompted you to offer 
them. We say, then : 

C 1. Emotions — feelings which find their 

Sensibilities are J end in themselves. 

I 2. Desires — which move us to act. 



A Second Look. 17 



Volition needs no division. It is ever the simple free act 
of the soul by whfch it determines and orders what shall be 
done. When you bade your tongue express the thought 
in your mind, it was an act of your will upon your body — a 
Volition; when you bade your mind recall the forgotten 
name, it was an order of your will upon your thinking fac- 
ulties, your mind. Will is the seat of power in the soul. 
We can, then, enlarge our analysis thus : 

f 1. Percepts. 
I. Intellections, which are 4 2 . Concepts. 



Acts of soul are 



1 3. Beliefs. 

II. Sensibilities, which are i *• Emotions. 

2. Desires. 



,111. Volitions. 
We will now consider each of these, briefly, in order. 



CHAPTER V. 

INTELLECTIONS-HOW WE THINK— THE FIRST STEP- 
PERCEPTION. 

A GOOD part of what we think we perceive is not actual 
perception, but inference. Thus we popularly say we see 
an orange, but the truth is we see but the shape and color of 
one half of it and mentally supply what is unseen. A skill- 
ful artist can paint the same outline and shades of color on 
a flat surface and make us believe we see an orange, though 
no orange is there. We think we hear a roaring sound, 
but we really perceive only the pulsations of our auditory 
nerve, which we refer to an external noise as the cause. 
But let that nerve be agitated in any other way, as by qui- 
nine, and we will hear the roaring just the same, although 



r8 Outlines of Psychology. 

no sound is in the air. The soul actually perceives only 
the affections of the nervous organism which centers in the 
brain. These affections, as thus perceived by the mind, are 
called Sensations. 

Again, our senses do not give us things, but attributes. 
The mind does not through the eye perceive immediately 
an orange, but reddish-yellow color bounded and shaded off 
in a peculiar way. The mind itself supplies the idea of a 
thing to possess these qualities. Perhaps an illustration may 
make this clearer : 

If upon putting on a pair of spectacles, you were to find 
that while houses and trees and men were as before of dif- 
ferent shapes and sizes, they all appeared green in color, you 
would very quickly be led to suspect that the glasses of 
your spectacles were green. Or if you look through a 
kaleidoscope at the broken bits of colored glass in the far- 
ther end, and find them always making symmetrical figures, 
and falling into regular triangles and hexagons however you 
may turn the instrument, you very naturally conclude that 
there is something in the construction of the instrument 
which makes the pieces appear in this orderly array. 

Now, when we look out upon the world through our 
mental apparatus we see colors, shapes, and sizes innumera- 
ble ; we hear sounds in infinite variety, perceive odors and 
savors and sensations of touch beyond computation, yet each 
of these impressions is perceived by us as coming from a 
substance, existing in space and time, here and now. However 
much scenes and sounds may vary, these ideas, Substance, 
Space, Time, etc., are found in each. Now we never per- 
ceive mere substance. What is the substance of a tree apart 
from those attributes which we perceive and classify — its 
size, shape, color, etc. ? We never perceive space apart from 
beings, or time apart from acts. Observe, too, how different 
are our ideas of Substance and Space and Time from our 
percepts of colors, sounds, etc. We see a color and feel 



Intellections — How we Think. 19 

that it is accidental, that is, that it might have been differ- 
ent, or it might not have been at all. The mind does not 
demand its existence. But of substance we say, there 
must be substance to possess attributes ; there must be what 
I call a tree to have the green foliage which I see, something 
around which the qualities my senses give me can be 
grouped. So of Space and Time and Cause. It is a de- 
mand of my mind, a necessity of my nature, to think of 
things as being somewhere, and of acts as occurring at 
some time, and from some cause. 

It would seem that just as the kaleidoscope is so con- 
structed with mirroring planes as to cause all objects looked 
at through it to assume a certain order and system, so our 
minds have been created by God so that all qualities and 
actions in the world are viewed as belonging to things, exist- 
ing in space, occurring in time, and proceeding from a cause. 
Substance, Cause, Space and Time are necessities of our 
thought The mind, by its own processes, unites the vari- 
ous sensations of color and shape under the central idea of 
thing which it supplies, and the result is what we call the 
Perception of the orange. 

Perception, then, is by the soul and of the external world, 
and has in it two elements, one originating in the external 
world, the other grounded in the very constitution of our souls. 
The qualities, such as the color, odor, etc., of a rose, originate 
without us, are given to us through our senses and consti- 
tute the first element of our Percept, Sensation. The ideas of 
a thing as the Cause of this sensation, and that it exists here 
and now, are supplied by the soul itself, as its way of under- 
standing sensations, and may be called Intuitive Ideas or 
concepts. The union of the Sensation and Intuitive Con- 
cept constitute the Percept, which is of a thing, here and now 
before us, possessed of certain qualities. 



2o Outlines of Psychology. 



Of Sensation. 

We have said that the pulsation of the optic nerve occa- 
sions the sensation we call color, of the auditory nerve that 
which we call sound. But it is evident that this pulsation is 
not the sensation itself. The nerves of a sleeper may be 
caused to pulsate, but he has no sensation of sound, and the 
most sensitive nerves of one under the influence of chloro- 
form may be torn and lacerated without the slightest feel- 
ing of pain. There must be an intelligent and attentive 
soul to receive and perceive the pulsations. 

Again, the physiologist can detect no difference in the 
composition of the nerve which unites the eye to the brain, 
and that which leads from the ear ; but if the one be irritated 
in any way it occasions the sensation of color, while the 
other, though similarly affected, produces the sensation of 
sound. Thus the same blow on the head will apparently 
cause the ears to hear a roaring sound and the eyes to see 
"stars." It seems, then, that Sensation is not purely phys- 
ical. That the pulsation of the nerve, which is purely phys- 
ical, must be received and interpreted by the soul, and that 
too in a way of its own, so that pulsations through different 
nerves, which would seem exactly alike to an outside ob- 
server, mean very different things to the soul. Color, 
sound, odor, etc., are then the soul's interpretation of the 
pulsations through the optic, auditory, olfactory, and other 
nerves. 

We say, then, that Sensation is the soul's interpretation of 
nervous pulsations, and that the soul, bringing to the sen- 
sations of color, etc. thus produced, the intuitive con- 
cepts of Substance, Space, Time, etc., unites the Sensations 
and Intuitions, and makes our Percept of an orange or other 
object. 

This subject of Perception is confessedly the most difficult 
point in Psychology, and demands thought and attention for 



Intellections— How we Think. 21 

its mastery. Perhaps the following illustration may be of 
service : * 

Suppose a man is lying asleep in a telegraph office. 
Through the wire from some distant point comes the elec- 
tric current, and the lever of his instrument moves back 
and forth, but the sleeper heeds it not. This represents 
simple pulsation, the wire being the nerve and the moving 
lever being the pulsating brain before it is noticed by the 
soul. Now suppose the man awakes ; he at once becomes 
conscious of the movement of his instrument. This repre- 
sents sensation, the observance by the soul of the pulsations 
of the brain, and the interpretation of them into sounds, 
colors, odors, etc. Now the operator brings to bear his 
knowledge of the telegraphic signals, and connects these 
sounds into words and sentences, making a telegraphic mes- 
sage. This knowledge of the sounds and capacity for ar- 
ranging them in a significant order, which the operator 
brings to bear in interpreting the signals, represents the In- 
tuitions of Space, Time, Cause, and Substance, which the 
soul supplies, and its power to unite these Sensations and 
Intuitions in the complete Percept. 

To repeat : The telegraph wire represents the human 
nerve ; the moving lever, the pulsating brain ; the awakened 
operator, the attentive soul ; the click as heard, the sensa- 
tion in the soul ; the -operator's knowledge and skill brought 
to bear in constructing an intelligible sentence from these 
separate sounds, stand for the Soul's Intuitive Concepts of 
Time, Space, Cause and Substance, and its power to under- 
stand sensations ; the complete message as understood by 
the operator represents the complete Percept. 

Let us close with an example : A pulsation from my 
olfactory nerves is suddenly noticed by the soul. Since it 
comes through that nerve the mind understands it to be an 
odor. The soul, by the law of its operations, supplies the 
ideas of cause and substance and space, and thinks of the odor 



22 



Outlines of Psychology. 



as being caused by some object outside itself. The eye 
being cast around transmits an impression through the optic 
nerve which the mind interprets as "red color." The mind 
now combines these sensations of odor and color and the 
intuitions of substance and space in one whole, and reports 
as before it " a circular foliated red thing, giving out a pecul- 
iar sweet odor," and having had experience of similar ob- 
jects before, to which we have given the common name, 
"rose," we say, "I see a rose," and the philosophers tell us 
we have formed a Percept of a rose. 



Summary. 



I. The elements of Perception are -J tm 



II. The processes of Perception are < 



Sensations. 
Intuitive Concepts. 
' i. Pulsation, in the 
brain. 
2. Sensation, in the 

soul. 
3 Intuitions, from the 

soul. 
4. Perception, by the 
soul. 



CHAPTER VI. 
THE SECOND STEP— CONCEPTION. 

THE elements of all the knowledge man can obtain of the 
external world are obtained through Perception, while 
Consciousness gives us directly the facts of our internal or 
soul-world. The other mental faculties are employed exclu- 
sively in working this material into the thousand forms of 



The Second Step — Conception. 23 

use and beauty which we call our "thoughts," and which 
we have classified as Concepts and Beliefs. 

What are Concepts ? 

Look at the fire. Now close your eyes and tell me how 
the fire looked. As you try to do so you bring up before 
you an idea of the fire. You repicture it in your mind just 
as you remember to have seen it a few moments before. So 
you image to your mind any objects you have heretofore 
seen, as a large man or a fine horse. These are Concepts. 

Again, you read of the fabled animal, half horse and half 
man, and your mind, striving to realize the appearance of 
such a creature, pictures a combination of some man's head 
on some horse's body. This, though also a concept, is not 
an exact reproduction of any object actually perceived by 
you, but a new combination of parts of two percepts. Since 
these two products, the fire and the centaur as pictured by 
your mind, are images of things perceived, we will call them 
Imaginative Concepts. 

The imagination has an inexhaustible range in forming 
these Concepts, since it can arrange the innumerable parts 
of percepts in infinite combinations. The head of any ani- 
mal may be imaged on the body of any other; every man 
seen may be pictured in every situation we have ever expe- 
rienced, and so on, making Imaginative Concepts in endless 
variety. There are but two limitations to this process : first, 
the mind cannot imagine any thing it has never perceived ; 
and, secondly, it cannot combine into one concept contra- 
dictory qualities. Thus a person who has never seen a parat- 
lelopipedon, could not even try to conceive one until it was 
described to him as a prism, whose base is a parallelogram, 
and then — if he understood those terms — his mind would 
reproduce a prism and a parallelogram which he has seen, 
and combine the two ideas to make his new concept of a 
parallelopipedon. The mind, then, cannot conceive things 
whose elements have never been experienced. Nor can 



24 Outlines of Psychology. 

it combine contradictory qualities in one Concept. It may 
picture a horse with the head of a man or of any other 
animal, or with no head at all, but it cannot picture a horse 
with a head and without a head at the same time. You can- 
not conceive of two mountains without a valley between 
them. We say, then, that Imaginative Concepts are based 
upon previous Percepts and do not need to be of actual, but 
only of possible, objects, that is, of things which might have 
been made. 

A very important class of Imaginative Concepts take the 
form of suggestions of future possibilities. Thus the ambi- 
tious man forms concepts of himself exercising power and 
influence; the avaricious man delights to picture himself 
possessed of great wealth ; the philanthropist images him- 
self as the rescuer of his fellow-men from want and suffering. 
Concepts of this kind are formed whenever we are called 
upon to decide upon any course of action. The possible 
alternatives are pictured before us, and the Will decides 
between them. Thus in the housewife's homely question 
as to whether she shall have roast beef for dinner, the 
mind brings up not only the Concept of roasted beef 
smoking on the table, but also alternative Concepts — as of 
beef cooked in some other way, or of mutton or other 
forms of food which might be prepared instead of the roast. 
With these Concepts and the motives for preferring each 
before it, the Will decides the question, and the busy arbi- 
ter of our culinary fate goes bustling about her prepara- 
tions. Every choice thus involves at least two competing 
Concepts. 

A second form of the Concept is what we have called Intui- 
tions or Intuitive Concepts in our last chapter. We mean 
by Intuitive Concepts those which are not reproductions of 
things without nor derivatives from them, but pure prod- 
ucts of the mind, which are necessary to its understanding 
the facts of experience. These are such as our ideas of 



The Second Step — Conception. 25 

Substance, Cause, Time, Space, etc., which have been 
mentioned before &s elements of Perception. It is true that 
these may not be realized as existing, or may not actually 
exist as ideas already formed in the mind before we have 
any sensation from the world without, or conscious experi- 
ence of soul-life within, yet these sensations and experi- 
ences are not the causes producing Intuitive Concepts, but 
only the occasions of their manifestation and development. 
They came forth from the soul itself by the law of its own 
activity. 

Among these Intuitive Concepts we must place the funda- 
mental and elementary ideas of Beauty, Truth, and Right. 
For there must have been a time in our experience, far back 
in our infancy doubtless, when we first saw something which 
we felt was " beautiful." How did we know it was beauti- 
ful ? Must there not have been in our soul the power to 
bring forth a standard of its own by which to judge of 
beauty ? So when we first felt a thing to be wrong, or judged 
it to be right. These standards of beauty, right, etc., have 
doubtless been greatly developed and improved since then ; 
by the cultivation of the Taste, the education of the Con- 
science, and the sharpening of the Intellect, you do not to- 
day esteem as beautiful, right, or true, things which you once 
considered so, but you have still your own standard by which 
you say, " This seems true, beautiful, or right to me." The 
distinctive feature of these Intuitive Concepts is that they 
are universal and necessary. Every one has his ideas of 
Time, Right, etc., and every one must view actions as occur- 
ring in time, and as right or not right. 

But from these Imaginative and Intuitive Concepts the 
Mind goes on to form others of still higher rank and greater 
value. When you say " man is mortal " you do not recall to 
my mind by the word " man " any particular individual I 
have seen, but you cause me to think of a whole class of 
beings as a class. Though I have never had a percept of a 



26 Outlines of Pyschology. 

man who was not of some particular race, complexion, size, 
etc., yet to receive the thought you express in the sentence 
" man is mortal," I must cast out of my percepts of the men 
I have seen all non-essentials, such as race, size and color, 
and combine in one whole certain ones which we regard as 
essential elements of man, such as animal life, rationality, etc. 
When I have thus by abstraction and combination found out 
and put together these essential elements I have a Concept 
which I name " man." " Man," then, is a general term which 
embraces all my Concepts of individual men. Thus also, cast- 
ing aside as non-essential the length and inclination of the 
sides of three-sided plane figures, I group under the general 
term "triangle" all that are bounded by three straight lines. 
These Concepts, "man," "triangle," etc., we call Logical 
Concepts, and by enabling us to think of things in classes 
they are of inestimable value to man. Without this power 
of the mind to condense, systematize, and label its knowl- 
edge, reasoning and science would be impossible, for the 
mind would be overwhelmed with an infinity of non-essen- 
tial circumstances at every step. All our general terms for 
things, such as "man," "horse," " star," as well as our names 
for qualities, as "redness," "hardness," etc., represent Log- 
ical Concepts. 

It is seen at once that these cannot be pictured like the 
Imaginative Concepts. You cannot imagine to yourself 
" man " or " redness," but only some man of definite size or 
color, or some red thing of a definite shape. 

We see, then, that Concepts are of three kinds, Imaginative, 
Intuitive, and Logical. 

Memory. 

We have seen that our Percepts of things before us are 
retained by the mind and recalled afterward in the form of, 
Imaginative Concepts. Thus the mind retains the impres- 
sion made by the features of an absent acquaintance, so that 



The Second Step — Conception. 27 

upon occasion you can repicture his form to yourself and 
describe it to another. This power to retain Percepts we 
call the faculty of Memory. 

Percepts are not stored singly by Memory, but are linked 
together by associations, so that upon recalling one many 
others often come trooping forth without any volition of 
ours. This involuntary re-appearance of the past we call 
Remembrance. Or, again, we may, by an effort of the Will, 
seek to reproduce some Percept we are conscious of having 
experienced, as when you try to recall the name of a per- 
son you may meet, or endeavor to bring up again scenes of 
your childhood. The mind travels along the meshes of 
association, seeking some clew to the missing experience, 
and following it when found until it brings forth, for Imag- 
ination to picture again, the old school house and the bright 
faces and merry sounds of the play-ground. This power of 
voluntary reproduction we call Recollection. 

If we picture to ourselves the mind in Perception as a Pho- 
tographer's Camera, the object lens would represent the exter- 
nal organ, as the eye or ear ; the focused rays would be the 
pulsation transmitted to the brain ; the sensitive plate the 
brain itself; the image formed by the mysterious properties 
of the collodion, the Percept ; then the dark-room in which 
the plate is stored for future use would be the Memory ; the 
attendants who bring forth the plate again to be printed 
from are Remembrance and Recollection; the artist who 
prints the pictures from the plate is Imagination, and the 
picture so made is an Imaginative Percept. 

The power by which the essential features of many indi- 
vidual Percepts are separated from the non-essential and 
then combined into a whole, forming the Logical Concept, 
is called the Synthetic Judgment. So we say the elements 
of a full-blown Logical Concept are : 1. Perception ; 2. Mem- 
ory, (including Retention, Remembrance, and Recollection ;) 
3. Imagination ; 4. Synthetic Judgment. The first furnishes 
2 



28 



Outlines of Psychology. 



the material, and the other three unite in the process of the 
manufacture of the Concept. 

Intuitive or Pure Concepts appear in their elementary 
forms as simple spontaneous products of the soul, and as 
such do not admit of analysis. Our Concepts of Space, 
Time, Cause, etc., as we have them now in our maturer 
years, could be traced back to much simpler forms, and per- 
haps to their sources, but such investigation is outside the 
limits of this outline. 



Concepts are : < 



I. Imaginative, which 
can be pictured. 
They are : 



Summary. 

i. Reproduction of 
actual Percepts, as 
of a house we have 
seen. 
2. Recombinations of 
Percepts, or parts 
of Percepts, as a 
Centaur. 

II. Intuitive, which are necessary and uni- 
versal ideas formed in every human mind* 
as the idea of Substance, Cause, Space, 
Time, etc. 

i. Derived from Im- 
aginative Con- 
cepts, as "house," 
"man," etc. 
2. Derived from In- 
tuitive Concepts, 
as triangle, a men- 
tal idea from our 
notion of space. 



III. 



Logical, 
which are : 



The Third Step — Belief. 29 



CHAPTER VII. 
THE THIRD STEP— BELIEFS. 

WE have shown how logical Concepts are formed 
singly, as the concept " horse " or " animal " from 
external percepts of horses and animals, and the concept 
" triangle" from a modification of our intuitive idea of Space. 
But we find in our mental products propositions in which 
two such concepts are united, as the assertion, " horses are 
animals." The faculty which forms these propositions is 
called Judgment, and the propositions themselves constitute 
our Beliefs. 

Sometimes the belief results from a direct comparison of 
the two Concepts constituting its subject and predicate, as 
in the instance above ; but at other times the relations of the 
Concepts are not so evident, and are only ascertained by 
comparing each with a common third. Thus we may say : 
All self-luminous bodies are suns; the stars are self-lumi- 
nous bodies; therefore the stars are suns. Here the belief 
that the stars are suns is reached by first identifying self- 
luminous bodies with suns, and afterward observing that the 
stars are identical with self-luminous bodies. The first in- 
stance — "horses are animals" — is an example of Immediate 
or Direct Judgment, and the last is an illustration of Mediate 
Judgment, or Reasoning. 

The mind in this process of Reasoning is guided by uni- 
form and fixed laws. The Judgment cannot exercise the 
freedom accorded to the Imagination to affirm the possible, 
it must declare only the actual, the real, as seen by the soul. 
So we say we can imagine this book printed on black paper 
with white ink, but we must believe that it is printed on white 
paper with black ink. So, too, the Reason must move in 



30 Outlines of Psychology. 

__ 9 — — ■ 

channels marked out for it by the Creator. If you admit 
that all self-luminous bodies are suns, and that all stars are 
self-luminous, you must believe that all stars are suns. 
Hence we see the important fact that the soul is not free in 
forming beliefs, and that convictions are forced upon it by 
facts when it considers them. You cannot believe what you 
choose, except as by prejudice you refuse fairly to consider 
the facts. 

An important distinction is yet to be made as to our Be- 
liefs. We say that " the sum of the parts of any thing is equal 
to the whole," and we also say, " Chautauqua is in New York." 
Both of these statements express conclusions of which we 
have not the shadow of a doubt, but the first does more : it 
expresses not only something which we know is true, but 
which we feel must be true, so that we could not conceive 
of the contrary. Thus we could as truly say, " The sum of 
the parts of any thing must be equal to the whole." This is 
not the case with the other belief cited. While it is just as 
true that Chautauqua is in New York, we could not truly 
say, " Chautauqua must be in New York," and we could 
easily conceive of it as being in another State. Beliefs are, 
then, i. Necessary, or, 2. Not necessary. The not-neces- 
sary beliefs are derived from our observation and experience, 
and hence are called Experiential Beliefs. Necessary be- 
liefs are based on the Intuitive Concepts of the mind, and 
are independent of experience. They are : 

1. Logical : as that "the whole is equal to the sum of the 

parts." 

2. Mathematical : as that " two straight lines cannot in- 

close space." 

3. Moral: as that "justice is right." 

4. Metaphysical : as that " every event is caused." 

We have seen that the processes of the mind in reaching 
conclusions from premises (as in the example concluding 
that " the suns are stars") are fixed and certain, and that the 



The Third Step — Belief. 31 

mind cannot knowingly deviate from them. If the premises 
are true the conclusions must be correct, and we can depend 
upon the conclusions of all right-minded reasoning to be 
just as certain as are the premises. Thus, if we can only 
say, " I thhik the stars are self-luminous," then we could only 
conclude, " I think the suns are stars ; " but if we could say, 
" The stars must be self-luminous," and " all self-luminous 
things must be suns," we could then conclude that " the 
stars must be suns." 

This remark prepares us to understand the difference in 
the nature of our belief in the conclusions of Pure Mathe- 
matics and those of other Sciences. In Pure Mathematics 
we reason about purely mental concepts — Number and 
Space — and use as our premises only necessary beliefs. I do 
not mean to affirm, with the pure Idealist, that there is no 
Space outside the mind, but that when we reason about a 
point " which has position but not size," or a line " which 
has length but no breadth," and of spaces inclosed by such 
lines, we are talking of things which have no existence 
outside the human mind. We may draw marks on slate, 
paper, or blackboard, and call them straight lines, but 
they are never absolutely straight, and they always have 
some breadth as well as length. We draw a triangle, as we 
call it, on the board, and prove that the sum of its three 
angles must equal two right angles ; and yet, as a matter of 
fact, the triangle is inaccurately drawn, and the angles would 
measure more or less than two right angles. It is evident, 
then, that the triangle we are arguing about is the theoretical 
one we have in our mind, and which we merely represent by 
the figure on the board. Mere ideas, then, of lines, trian- 
gles, etc., are created by the mind itself, and are endowed in 
their creation with certain necessary qualities. We have not 
found somewhere in the world a straight line with length 
and no breadth, and by measuring it reached the conclusion 
that it is " the shortest distance between two points," but 



32 Outlines of Psychology. 

the mind, conceiving two points in space and the most direct 
route from one to the other, names that " a straight line," 
and gives the definition, " a straight line is the shortest dis- 
tance between two points." 

Now this proposition, as well as all other definitions and 
axioms of Mathematics, is not only a belief, but a necessary 
belief; and as every deduction of Pure Mathematics is de- 
rived by logical reasoning from these definitions and axioms, 
all of its conclusions are necessary also, and so we not only 
prove that the sum of the angles of a plane triangle do equal 
two right angles, but that they must do so. 

But in most other Sciences we do not create our premises, 
but get them from observation, which gives us not necessary, 
but only actual, truths ; not what must be, but only what is. 
And, however trustworthy our observations may be, our 
reasoning only leads us to the true, not the necessary. Hence 
we cannot prove that the earth must attract all other bodies 
as a matter of necessity, but we can convince any fair mind 
that it does so, as a matter of fact. 

Any science, then, built upon necessary beliefs, will be able 
to establish its conclusions as necessary, and to force them 
to universal and absolute acceptance ; while those which 
draw their premises from observation can only hope to prove 
their conclusions true, and can only demand of men that 
they accept what careful observation and rigid criticism 
have verified. Mathematics itself, so soon as it leaves its 
world of ideal points and lines and curves to deal with the 
practical questions of life, as in Surveying, Engineering, and 
other branches of Applied Mathematics, has to introduce 
observations about local attraction, strength of timbers, etc., 
and its conclusions are then no more necessary than those 
of any other science depending upon observation for its 
premises. 

In this is seen the absurdity of the demand of some that 
the beliefs of the Christian Religion be demonstrated to 



The Third Step — Beliefs. 35 

Mathematical conviction ; that is, so that no one can possibly 
doubt. For the Science of Theology draws its premises from 
observation and experience, and depends upon facts revealed 
to man as truths in the Book of Nature, or the Volume of 
Revelation. A religion which could be Mathematically dem- 
onstrated must, like Pure Mathematics, be evolved wholly 
from within man himself, and one might well prefer, as a 
guide through life, the well-authenticated revelations of a 
perfect God, to the deductions, however necessary, of man, 
a fallen and corrupt being. 

The difference between necessary and experiential beliefs 
is not one of certainty, but of conceivability. In the former 
it is not possible to conceive the opposite ; in the latter we 
can always conceive the contrary, however firmly we hold 
to the proposition as stated. We believe that the sum of 
the angles of a plane triangle is equal to two right angles, 
and cannot conceive any plane triangle having such sum less 
or greater. We believe that the Iliad was written by an 
intelligent being, but it is conceivable that it might have 
been produced by tossing up the number of Greek letters it 
contains until they accidentally fell into the order in which 
they are found in that poem. Yet who will say that he is 
less certain that the Iliad was the product of intelligent 
thought, than that the sum of the angles is as stated ? So 
we may conceive that Christ was an enthusiast or an im- 
postor, and that his teachings are wrong and misleading, 
but the fair-minded man, examining the facts, will not so 
believe. 

The whole process of intellection culminates in Beliefs, or 
faiths. The Logical Concept was elaborated from the Im- 
aginative, simply that the mind might the more readily use 
its material in reasoning, and attain convictions. Through 
Pulsation, Sensation, Intuition, Perception, Retention, Recol- 
lection, Logical Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning, all 
the soul's long search after truth ends here when it says, 



34 Outlines of Psychology. 

"This is thus and so." In faiths, and faiths only, the mind 
rests. Man was created to believe. 

Summary. 
All Beliefs are : i. Results of Comparison ; 2. Immediate 
or Mediate ; 3. Necessary or Experiential, and are, 4. The 
object and end of Thinking. 



CHAPTER VIII. 
HOW WE FEEL. 



IN Chapter III we detected as the second great division 
of our soul acts certain ones which we called Sensibili- 
ties. These include the pains and pleasures, hopes and fears, 
joys and sorrows ; in fact, every motion man experiences in 
his checkered life. We cannot undertake to enumerate, but 
only to group and classify them. 

If you will take the trouble to turn back to page 16, you 
will see that we have already divided the Sensibilities into 
two chief classes : 

1. Emotions, or those sensibilities which do not call for 
action, as the sense of awe or of sorrow, or the feeling of 
comfort or discomfort. 

2. Desires, which are motives to immediate action, as 
thirst, curiosity, love , and hatred. 

We spoke there of the comfortable feeling of warmth we 
had as the fire blazed up, the feeling of bright cheerfulness, 
or of tender melancholy, as we recalled the past, and the 
sentiment of gratitude to the good Being who had led us so 
kindly along life's way. 

Now, these three represent three classes into which all our 
Emotions may be divided. The first class, as the feeling of 
warmth, are purely bodily sensations ; that is, they have their 



How We Feel.* 35 



origin in the states of our physical organism. Some are neg- 
ative, as Weariness, Languor, Discomfort ; others positive, 
as Heat, Pain, Pleasure, and the sense of vital Energy, the 
feeling that we are well and strong. We call these the Phys- 
ical Emotions, or Feelings. 

The emotions of the second class arise partly from bodily, 
and partly from mental, causes. They are such as Cheerful- 
ness and Melancholy, Interest and Ennui, Anxiety and In- 
difference. These are the Physio-Psychical Emotions. 

The emotions of the third class are purely psychical. 
They all arise out of some perception of the intellect, and 
are not dependent upon the states of the body. These are 
usually more intense, yet less lasting, than the emotions of 
the other two classes. They are such as : 

1. Surprise, Wonder, and Admiration. 

2. Disgust, Contempt, and the sense of the Ludicrous. 

3. Shame, Sorrow, and Pity. 

4. Fear, Horror, and Despair. 

5. Emotions excited by the Beautiful, the Sublime, the 

Awful. 

6. Adoration, Love, Joy, and Peace. 

7. Moral Approval and Disapproval. 

What the nature and characteristic of each of these Emo- 
tions is ; how, for instance, Surprise differs from Wonder, and 
what is the line of distinction between the ludicrous and the 
disgusting, or the exact step from the sublime to the ridicu- 
lous ; what purpose in the life and development of man each 
of these serves ; as, for example, how important is the feeling 
we call " Pain," to urge the soul to care for some part of the 
body which is being injured ; how Weariness is the body's 
cry for rest and sleep; how Cheerfulness and Interest aid the 
work of life ; and what are the uses even of Fear and Hor- 
ror, Shame and Sorrow in God's great plan for man's devel- 
opment, are questions of interest and importance, but we 
cannot discuss them here. The reader will find them treated 
2* 



2,6 Outlines of Psychology. 

in Munsell's "Psychology," pp. 196-219, or in any complete 
and systematic treatise on the Emotions. Enough has been 
said to indicate the field for exploration, and this is our pres- 
ent purpose. 

The second great class of Sensibilities — the Desires — can 
best be subdivided into classes corresponding to the three 
under which the Emotions were arranged, namely : Physical 
Desires, or Appetites; Physio-Psychical Desires, or Propensi- 
ties; and Psychical Desires, or Affections. Besides these 
there is one other motive to action which is so different 
from all others, and so important in itself as to require 
separate consideration. This is the Moral Impulse or Con- 
science. 

As a whole, the Desires are demands of our Material and 
Immaterial natures for some object of gratification suited to 
each specially, or to the complex whole. They are logically 
preceded by, and based upon, prior emotions, though often 
we cannot distinguish any interval of time between the desire 
and the emotion which, we say, must have come before it. 
Thus the desire for food is based upon the simple feeling of 
hunger, the desire for knowledge upon the emotion of won- 
der, the desire for society upon the emotion of sympathy, the 
desire to benefit upon the emotion of love, and resentment 
upon the sense of wrong. 

The great part which Desires play in the drama of human 
development is evident at a glance. The gratification of de- 
sires constitutes man's present happiness, and by his desires 
alone is he stimulated to that exercise of his powers, physic- 
al, mental, and moral, which is the condition and the means 
of their development. For every desire of man God has cre- 
ated a corresponding object able to satisfy it : Food for Hun- 
ger, water for Thirst, fellow-beings for our Sociability, truth, 
beauty, and goodness for our Love, knowledge and power 
for our Curiosity and Ambition, and heaven for our highest 
aspirations. Truly, all things seem to be made in pairs, 



How We Feel. 37 



"the one over 'gainst the other." The utter decrepitude of 
man is pictured *by the wise man when he says, "And desire 
shall fail." 

We have seen that Desires are divided into Appetites, 
Propensities, and Affections. Let us enumerate a few of 
each class. 

1. Appetites. These are : (1) Natural, as hunger, thirst, 
and sexual love ; or (2) Acquired, as the craving for opium, 
alcohol, tobacco, etc. 

2. Propensities. They are: (1) Selfish, as the desire for 
self-preservation, self-development, and self-gratification; 
for knowledge, (Curiosity,) for property, (Acquisitiveness,) or 
for power, (Ambition ;) (2) Social, as the desire for company, 
(Sociality;') the desire to do like others, (Imitativeness,) 
which builds the throne of Fashion ; the desire of esteem, 
(Approbativeness ;) the desire for superiority, (Emulation ;) 
and the respect for truth, (Veracity,) which forms the founda- 
tion of the social fabric, and makes society possible. 

3. Affections. These are : (1) Malevolent, as Indifference, 
Hatred, Envy, and Jealousy. (2) Benevolent, as Patriotism, 
Philanthropy, and Piety, or the Love of Country, of Man- 
kind and of God. 

We must here introduce two other of our Sensibilities 
which we have not before classified or mentioned on account 
of certain marked peculiarities. They are Hope and Fear. 
These are certainly in some sort Emotions, and yet in an- 
other sense they are motives to action, and hence would 
seek a place with the Desires. They have not, however, like 
the true Desires, any specific or peculiar object. Hunger 
(as a Desire) demands food, Sociability asks for company, 
Ambition for power ; but what one thing does Hope or Fear 
demand ? They appear rather as concomitants and inten- 
sifiers of the true desires, so that with every desire we have, 
there is more or less of hope or fear with regard to its grati- 
fication. 



38 



Outlines of Psychology. 



Sensibilities are : « 



r I. Emotions 
which 
are: 



Summary. 

"i. Physical, (Feelings,) as 
Heat. 

2. Physio-Psychical, (Dis- 
positions,) as Cheer- 
fulness. 

3. Psychical, (true Emo- 
tions,) as Terror. 



II. Desires, 
which 
are: 



1. Physical, (Appetites,) as 

Thirst. 

2. Physio-Psychical, (Pro- 

pensities,) as Socia- 
bility. 

3. Psychical, (Affections,) 

as Hatred. 



CHAPTER IX. 



CONSCIENCE 



AMONG the most powerful motives to human action is 
what we usually call Conscience. A little reflection, 
however, will show that the term Conscience is popularly 
used to indicate, not a simple, but a complex faculty of the 
soul. We say : " My Conscience tells me that lying is wrong ; 
my Conscience troubles me about a certain act ; my Con- 
science demands that I do what I believe to be right." But 
note how different are these acts which are thus all assigned 
to one source. The first is a judgment, " lying is wrong ; " 
the second is an emotion, remorse ; the third is a demand 
upon the will that it shall choose the right. Now the judg- 
ment, "lying is wrong," is just as much an act of the Reason 



Conscience. 39 



as is the decision, "curves are beautiful;" the feeling of a 
tioubled Conscience is just as much an Emotion as the feel- 
ing of grief at any loss or mistake. Hence, when we call 
these acts of Conscience, we make it a faculty for judging, 
and also a faculty for feeling on moral subjects. But why 
separate moral judgments and emotions from all others, and 
assign them to a distinct faculty ? Certainly, the faculty 
which says a thing is true or beautiful is the same one which 
says an act is right or wrong. The processes, too, are the 
same. If we are in doubt as to the truth of a statement we 
refer to the authorities and weigh the evidence in the case, 
and exactly in the same way, if we are in doubt of the right 
or wrong of an action we refer to the authorities, the opinions 
of good men, the teachings of the Church, or ultimately the 
Word of God, and after weighing the evidence we decide just 
as we did in the other case. Moral decisions, therefore, are 
not to be treated as made by a special faculty, but simply by 
the Judgment acting ©n moral matters. In these decisions 
it is as liable to err as in others. We err as to what is right 
and wrong in any given case, just as we err as to what is 
wise or prudent, because of the infirmity of our Judgment. 

Nor is there any thing so peculiar in the Moral Emotions 
— Remorse at wrong-doing, Approbation at right conduct — 
that they should require to be credited to a special faculty as 
their source. Why say, " My Conscience is troubled at sin," 
and, " My heart is troubled at sorrow ? " The distinction is 
misleading. The Moral Judgment and Moral Emotion, 
therefore, need not be specially considered here, but take 
their places naturally among the Beliefs and Sensibilities 
already discussed ; but the third function of what is popu- 
larly termed Conscience is the really peculiar and distinctive 
one, the one which appears as a motive to action, and this 
we should treat as the true office of Conscience. This is the 
direct demand, the Categorical Imperative, which says to 
the will, "Choose the Right." The relations of Conscience, 



40 Outlines of Psychology. 

in this sense, will be seen to be similar to those of the desires 
in general. We have seen that every desire is associated 
with some particular emotion and based upon a prior intel- 
lection ; thus we perceive a strange sight, feel the emotion of 
wonder and curiosity; the desire of knowledge is immediately 
developed, and demands to have the matter explained. So 
with moral questions. We decide an act to be right, feel 
a sense of obligation resting upon us, and at once there 
arises a demand on our wills that we do it. Conscience, 
then, in the restricted sense in which the term is here used, 
must rightly takes its place beside the Desire class of the 
Sensibilities, as one of the most powerfnl motives to Volition, 
based on prior intellection and accompanied by its appro- 
priate emotion. In one respect, however, Conscience differs 
from all other motives to action, it is authoritative in its de- 
mands. Other motives may be urgent. This is imperative. 
We shall here, then, consider Conscience as the Moral Im- 
pulse, that within us which ever and always demands of every 
man that he shall do the right as he sees it ; not necessarily 
the absolute right, but the right as it appears to him. If I 
believe a thing to be right, my Conscience bids me do it, and 
though afterward new light may convince me that I made a 
mistake in thinking it right, yet the sense of moral approba- 
tion, which arose when I first chose to heed that command 
of Conscience, still approves my obedience. Believing as I 
did, I should have acted as I did, though perhaps a charge 
of willful or unjustifiable ignorance may come against me for 
not having known better. 

This sense of Moral Approbation follows every act of obe- 
dience to the one cry of Conscience, " Do the Right." " I 
have lived in all good Conscience before God until this 
day," says Paul, though he had persecuted the Church, for he 
" verily thought with himself that he ought " so to do. 

Is Conscience, then, as it has been called, " The voice of 
God in the soul? " If by Conscience is meant that faculty 



Conscience. 41 



of judging mor^l things which says of any act, cl This is 
right," or "This is wrong," we answer, No; for then the 
" voice of God " would be found telling Paul at one time to 
destroy and at another to promote faith in Jesus as the 
Christ. But if we mean by Conscience, the demand in the 
soul, springing from the feeling of obligation, that every voli- 
tion should be in accord with what Reason says is right, we 
answer, Yes ; for God has planted in us this Impulse, which, 
as a voice crying in the wilderness of man's degradation, 
demands with divine authority this obedience, and points us 
upward to a higher and better light. As food is the object of 
Hunger, as truth is the object of Curiosity, so the Right, as 
Reason sees it, is the object of the Imperative of Conscience. 

Is this impulse of Conscience a true guide to right action ? 
It is not an infallible guide. Paul's Conscience urged him 
to persecute the Church ; the Hindu woman's Conscience 
moves her to cast her child into the Ganges, for she thinks 
she ought to do it as an act of worship to God. Conscience, 
then, is not an ultimate standard of right and wrong. " I 
know nothing against myself; yet am I not hereby justified," 
says Paul. " He that judgeth me is the Lord." The will of 
God is, then, the only infallible guide to human action, that 
and that alone is the ultimate Right. What that will is we 
must set ourselves to ascertain ; our Moral Judgments must 
be made in accordance with it ; our moral acts must be meas- 
ured by that standard. Herein consists our responsibility 
for right action, because God gives us power to know his 
Will if we have the earnest desire to do it. 

Conscience is, however, a true guide in its demand that 
we do the right as we see it. If a thing be wrong to us we 
must not do it, and those who have not the clear revelation 
of the divine will which we enjoy, find in Conscience " a law 
unto themselves." Our errors, when we act according to 
Conscience, are due to the mistakes of Judgment as to what 
is right, and for these mistakes we are responsible just so far 



42 Outlines of Psychology. 

as we have power to avoid them, and no further. If " Light 
is come into the world," and we love darkness rather than 
light and remain in willful ignorance of the Right, " this is 
our condemnation." The conclusion of the whole matter is, 
that we must enlighten our Moral Judgment to the utmost 
so as to get correct decisions as to the right in every case, and 
that we must then implicity obey the Voice of Conscience 
bidding us do what we have decided to be right, every man 
for himself. 

Summary. 

i. A Faculty for Moral Judgment, asserting, 
"This act is right." 

2. A Faculty for Moral Emotion, " My Con- 
science troubles me." 

3. A Moral Impulse, urging always, " Do 
the Right." • 

Strictly speaking, the third is the true definition. Con- 
science is a Moral Impulse to action. 

It is a true, but not an infallible, guide to man, and" de- 
mands to be instructed and enlightened to accord with the 
supreme Right known to us as the Will of God. 



Conscience is 
popularly : 



CHAPTER X. 
VOLITION— HOW WE DETERMINE. 

WE now come to consider the last class of Soul Move- 
ments, (see p. 15,) the Volitions. These are the 
product of the sovereign Will of man, which chooses, deter- 
mines, orders. 

Man is an active being. Mind and body are well-nigh 
every moment doing something under the guidance of the 



Volition — How We Determine. 43 

1 _ 

Reason and at the bidding of the Will. Even our Beliefs, the 
ultimate object and the end of all our Intellections, are only 
valuable as they are bases of action. A dead faith that re- 
sults not in work is naught. Our Sensibilities are, as we 
have seen, in their highest form, but motives to action, men- 
tal and physical. Volition, then, is the supreme movement 
of the soul. 

But the Will is the most important of our faculties, not 
simply because it directs the energies of both mind and 
body, but also for the reason that it alone of all our facul- 
ties is absolutely free. It is in willing that man shows him- 
self as a free personality, and to this freedom attaches moral 
responsibility and all the tremendous consequences that flow 
from it. 

Our Percepts, the basis and material of our Intellections, 
come to us from without, and what they shall be is beyond 
our control. You perceive this book to be of a certain size and 
shape, and you cannot see it otherwise. You look around 
you and see not what you would, but what actually exists. 
We have already seen (page 30) that Beliefs can be forced 
upon us. We cannot deny the evidences of our senses, nor 
reject the logical inferences of our reason. We must believe 
that which is proven to our minds. 

Nor are our Sensibilities free movements of the soul. We 
do not feel glad or sorry, bold or fearful, at our own. pleas- 
ure. We are forced to feel awe or terror in the presence of 
the tornado or the earthquake, and joy and grief neither 
come nor flee at our bidding. 

Neither Intellections nor Sensibilities, then, are absolutely 
free. They can be forced upon us. But the choice of the 
soul, who can force it ? Indeed, a forced choice, a neces- 
sitated volition, is a contradiction in terms and utterly in- 
conceivable. Here, then, is found that freedom and re- 
sponsibility of which man is conscious. We ever choose for 
ourselves, and are morally responsible for our choice and its 



44 Outlines of Psychology. 

consequences, and for them alone ? This is evident to every 
man's Consciousness. Ask a man why he perceives the sky 
as blue, recalls his former home as a two-story cottage, be- 
lieves in the law of gravity, or the conclusions of geometry? 
or why he feels sorrow in bereavement, and he will say that he 
cannot help it ; that these things are in accordance with his 
nature and beyond his control. But ask him why he walks 
up the street instead of down, or why he chooses a particular 
course of study, or performs any other act of Will, and he 
will say, " Because I choose," or " Because it seems best to 
me," but never will he honestly say, " Because I could not 
help it," meaning that he could not have chosen otherwise. 
The language, the laws, and the universal Consciousness of 
all people testify that man does ande ver must believe him- 
self free in his volitions and responsible for them. This 
freedom it is which gives to Volition its peculiar dignity and 
its exalted position in the soul. 

There are four steps leading up to, and culminating in, 
the act of Volition : i. Conception of possible acts. 2. Mo- 
tives for and against the acts proposed. 3. Choice between 
them. 4. Executive Volition. Let us illustrate them. 

Consider what you shall do about this book which you 
have in your hand. First. Imagination conceives of two 
or more possible actions which your Will might order, 
as that you might skip this page, or lay the book down, or 
read on. 

Second. As soon as these Concepts are formed, Judgment, at 
the instigation of Conscience and Reason, passes upon them 
to decide if they are wrong, profitable, pleasant, etc., com- 
paring them with your mental standard of the right, the use- 
ful, the agreeable, etc., and thereupon there arise in the mind 
motives for and against each proposed course. Indolence 
or indifference, perhaps, urge you to skip this discussion. 
Weariness says, lay the book entirely aside, while Curiosity or 
perhaps Conscience moves you to read on. Emulation or 



Volition — How We Determine. 45 

Ambition may cbme in to urge you to master the subject, 
while Hunger or Sociability may call upon you to stop to 
enjoy the pleasures of the table or of company. A hundred 
subtle motives may be present, but there are always at least 
two. No possible action is ever proposed to your Will but 
that it has a choice between it and some other action, or be- 
tween it and no action at all ; that is, between action and 
quiescence. And for each of these alternatives there is at 
least one motive, though it be on the one hand, but the desire 
for notoriety, which almost always urges us to every vigor- 
ous course proposed, or, on the other, the desire for ease, 
which about as universally opposes all such action. In the 
present case we will suppose that you are being urged to 
continue reading by Curiosity, and to desist by Indolence. 
These two steps, the alternative propositions and the motives 
for them, are preliminary to the exercise of your Will. They 
are movements of your Intellect and Sensibilities. 

Third. The Will makes a decision in favor of one of the 
possible actions before it. You choose to read on, and in 
this act of choice the soul is free. You may or may not 
have listened impartially to the motives, and it is wrong to 
say you are governed by the " strongest motive " in making 
your choice, for a motive has no strength in itself. It is 
strong if it pleases Will, weak if it does not, and the same 
motives do not always have the same influence on the same 
man. Certainly no one with a healthy Will can honestly say 
that any motive was so strong as to compel him to a certain 
course. You were free in your choice to continue reading, 
and you are conscious of it. 

Fourth. The Will issues its order to the executive officers 
of the soul to "carry its choice into effect. When you decide to 
continue reading, it orders the muscles of the arm and hand 
to hold the book before your eyes, or turn the leaf, and it 
issues its order to the mental powers under its control, bid- 
ding the Intellect to concentrate its powers of thought upon 



46 Outlines of Psychology. 

the subject in hand and consider attentively the sentences 
read. 

With this fourth step — Executive Volition — the action of 
the soul in the case supposed ends. In this, also, it is per- 
fectly free, and even independent of the choice which pre- 
ceded it. We may choose, but not order the execution of 
our Volition, may decide to study the subject, and yet not 
put forth the hand or concentrate the thoughts. 

Since both the decisive Volition we call Choice and the 
Executive Volition are free actions of the Soul, we are con- 
sciously responsible for both, and so we feel the justness of 
the teaching of Scripture that he who chooses the death of 
his fellow-man, " whosoever hateth his brother," is a mur- 
derer in spirit, though he may not put forth his hand against 
him. 

" But, are not motives the causes of choice ? Surely we 
could not choose to do an act for which there was no motive 
present." True, indeed, we must have a motive for every 
choice, and always do have two at least .present in every 
choice, for we cannot choose except there be at least two 
courses open to us, and for each there will be some motive. 
But there is a wide difference between a thing being a neces- 
sary antecedent of an act and being a cause of it. A true cause 
is that which has power to produce, which necessitates a result. 
All other antecedents, however necessary to the result, are 
but occasions or conditions of it. The determination of the 
author to write and of the printer to publish are the only 
true causes of the existence of this book, and the existence 
of Psychological truth to be expressed, and of type, paper, 
ink, etc., whereby to express it, were but the occasion of these 
volitions. Only Will has power, only Will can cause. 

In a Court the Judge cannot decide any thing until some 
member of the bar brings a case before him. His decision 
is thus occasioned but not determined by the pleading of the 
lawyer; he decides because the advocate presents a case, but 



Volition — How We Determine. 47 

he decides as he himself sees best. So the human Will, as 
the autocrat of the soul, cannot decide anything until Imagi- 
nation has presented it a case to decide. This it does by 
drawing a Concept of two possible alternative actions of 
Will, and these actions are each advocated by motives. 
Then the Will can and does decide, but the choice is 
its own. 

Yet, free as the Will is, it can bind itself. Its own acts re- 
peated over and over become habits of choice, which, though 
able to be broken in any case, are rarely so cast aside. Many 
acts, originally needing a special volition, become so habitual 
as to be performed without conscious consideration, as the 
motions of our members in walking, talking, and eating. 
Thus, also, many important movements of the soul come to 
be made almost unconsciously. Mighty is habit for good or 
for evil. Saddest of the sad scenes of earth is the sight of 
the young man being enwrapped by the meshes of an evil 
habit, or of the old man bound by its iron chain, while he 
whose voluntary choice has by constant repetition formed 
fixed habits of virtue, so that the soul " rests in Providence, 
moves in Charity, and turns upon the poles of truth," is a 
spectacle which delights heaven and blesses earth. Like the 
strong man of old, the human Will, as God sends it forth, is 
a free and mighty ruler, and cannot be fettered by the new 
ropes or the green withs of its foes ; but it may prove false 
to its mission, and in the lap of license may barter away 
its liberty until it finds itself the helpless- captive of its 
foes. Yet even then, if it shall rouse itself again and call 
upon the great Author of its being, its vigor shall return, 
and it shall break the bands of its enemies and disappoint 
their hopes. 

In volition man exercises his highest prerogative and mani- 
fests his divine origin and likeness. We have already said 
that only a Will can be a Cause, that only in Will lies true 
power. Men say popularly that the earth has the power to 



48 Outlines of Psychology. 

hold the moon in its orbit, or the tornado has power to up- 
root the oak, but it is not so. They have necessity, not power. 
The earth cannot but attract the moon, the tornado cannot 
refrain from uprooting the oak. Power can act in different di- 
rections, necessity in but one. We repeat, only a free Will can 
have power and be a cause. God, the great First Cause of 
all things, has supreme power; and man, created and endowed 
with a free will is a true cause within his limited sphere, a 
little god. All nature around him is under the dominion of 
inexorable law; the stars move in their appointed courses 
without option of their own ; the seasons come and go, the 
rivers, winds, and tides move restless back and forth ; " all 
things are full of labor " and of change, and yet in all these 
there is no choice. Like the wheels of a mighty clock they 
but fulfill the course appointed by their Maker and register 
his will. Even in man, the laws of life rule inexorably over 
his body, and the laws of thought and feeling furnish chan- 
nels for his intellections and emotions. But when the 
moment of decision comes, the Will steps forth as a sover- 
eign, clothed with autocratic powers, and gives its sentence. 
Thus is man made in the image of God. 

SUMMARY. 

The movements of the soul in Volition are : 
i. Conception of possible alternative actions. 

2. Motives for and against each. 

3. Choice, by the Will — free. 

4. Executive Volition — free. 

The Will is the seat of human power and responsibility, 
and a true cause in its limited sphere, as God is in his un- 
limited domain. 



AARY, 



lich are of three classes : 



1. Muscular. / 1. Smell. 

2. Organic. \ 2. Taste. 

3. Special. These are: •< 3. Hearing. 

J 4. Sight. 
I 5. Touch. 



The formation of Concepts involves : 



II 



1. Memory. 
Imagination. 
Synthetic Judgment. 



lelings.) These are: 



1. Negative, as Weariness, Weakness, etc. 

2. Positive, as Vitality, Pain, etc. 



(1. CI 
^2. In 
(3. Ai 



1. Cheerfulness and Melancholy, 
ical (Dispositions.) -^ 2. Interest and Ennui. 

' nxiety and Indifference. 



treatsjrue Emotions.) 

r se may be classified 



( 1. Surprise, Wonder, and Admiration. 

^ 2. Disgust, Contempt, Sense of the Ludicrous. 

3. Shame, Sorrow, Pity. 

4. Pear, Horror, Despair. 

/ 5. Beauty, Sublimity, Eeverence. 
^ 6. Joy, Peace, etc. 



petites.) 1 1. Hunger and Thirst. 
" Sexual Desire. 
Desire for Sleep. 



- ( L 
fiey are : \ 2. Sexual Desire. 

fiical (Propensities,) which are : 

ffections.) i 1. Malevolent, as 
;wo kinds : •< Hatred. 

1. Benevolent, as Love. 



irsonality— the real self. 

cts. 
sitated. 

ssible alternative acts. 
1 against each. 
Will — a free act. 
ion — a free act. 



1. Desire for Self-preservation. 

2. Desire for Self-clevelopment. 

3. Desire for Self-gratification. 

4. Curiosity. 

5. Acquisitiveness. 

6. Ambition. 

7. Sociability. 

8. Imitativeness, Emulation, etc. 

9. Veracity, (desire for truth.) 



OUTLINE; SUMMARY, 



1. INTELLECTIONS, 

which are of three kinds : 



Percepts 



2. Concepts, which are: 



1. Sensations, which are of three classes • 

2. Intuitions. 



Imaginative 

Intuitive. 

Logical. 



1 1- Muscular. , i. SmelL 

Organic. 2 . Taste. 

S]»-eial. These are: < 3. Hearing 

4. Sight. 

5. Touch. 



- The formation of Concepts involve 



1. Memory. 

2. Imagination. 

3. Synthetic Judgment. 



3. Beliefs, which are of two i 



1. Necessary. 

2. Experiential. 



1. Physical (Feelings.) These are- i 1§ N e ? atiy e, as Weariness, Weakness, etc. 
' I 2. Positive, as Vitality, Pain, etc. 



PSYCHOLOGY 



jIL SENSIBILITIES, 

which comprise 



VOLITIONS, 

of which we say 



Emotions, 

which are of three kinds : 



J 2. Desires, 

which are of three 



2. Physio-psycliieal (Dispositions.) 



Anxiety and Indifference. 



Psychical, (true Emotions.) 

These may be classified ; 



1. Surprise, Wonder, and Admiration. 

2. Disgust, Contempt, Sense of the Ludicrous. 

3. Shame, Sorrow, Pity. 

4. Fear, Horror, Despai r 
" verenee. 



-. Fear, Ho*.^!, j^^o^«ii. 
/ 5. Beauty, Sublimity, Eeve: 
*■ 6. Joy, Peace, etc. 



1. Physical (Appetites.) ( 1. Hunger and Thirst. 
They are : 1 2. Sexual Desire. 

( 3. Desire for Sleep. 



2. Physio-psychical (Propensities,) which are 



3. Psychical (Affections.) 
These are of two kinds : h 



1. Malevolent. 

Hatred. 

1. Benevolent, 



1. Desire for Self-preservation. 

2. Desire for Self-clevelopment. 

3. Desire for Self-gratification. 
i. Curiosity. 

5. Acquisitiveness. 

6. Ambition. 
1. Sociability. 
8. Imitativeness, Emulation, etc. 

Love. \ 9. Veracity, (desire for truth.) 



>3. Conscience, (or the Moral Impulse.) 

Their source is the ego in its highest sense— the true personality— the real self. 

I o TW- xv. ™„* ,.- f-^ n „,.„ . ! 1- They are causes, not effects. 
2. Their characteristics are: j g ^ m ^ nQt neoessitated . 



3. Processes leading to Volition 



Concepts of possible alternative i 
Motives for and against each. 
Choice by the Will— a free act. 
Executive volition — a free act. 



Conclusion. 53 



CHAPTER XI. 

CONCLUSION. 

WE have now sketched all the processes of our soul- 
life from their incipiency in Sensation to their cul- 
mination in that highest of our soul-acts, Volition. We have 
traced all human effects to their ultimate cause and found 
the Will seated at the center of the soul directing its ener- 
gies with God-given authority. This is, indeed, the true ego, 
the very core and essence of the soul. God willed, and ma- 
terial worlds sprang into being. Man wills, and worlds of 
thought and manifold forms of beauty and utility come forth 
at his fiat. Reason leads us to conclusions of incalculable 
value, but Reason exists because of the infirmity of our 
natures. God does not reason to his conclusions. He 
knows without debate. Reason is great. Will is God-like. 
Here, then, we take our stand and re-survey the field. 

It has been necessary, in order to attain a clear view of our 
soul acts, to consider them as the product of distinct faculties 
and as succeeding each other in a definite order. But having 
thus separated and examined each element of our soul-life, 
it is now necessary to emphasize the fact that the soul is not 
thus consciously divided into separate parts, nor do its acts 
of intellection, emotion, and volition succeed each other at 
perceptible intervals of time. The soul is a unit and indivisi- 
ble, and though we say Perception must logically come be- 
fore Conception, Desire before Volition, yet in our daily life 
each moment brings a trooping train of Thoughts, Feelings, 
and Volitions inextricably intermingled, and apparently si- 
multaneous. We are always thinking, always feeling, always 
willing. Sometimes one of these forms of soul-activity is 



54 Outlines of Psychology. 

predominant at the expense of the others, but none are ever 
entirely shut out. When you are thinking intensely you do 
not feel things which at other times would affect you, but 
you do feel some things. When you give yourself up to 
emotion you do not and cannot examine closely, and if you 
criticise sharply you diminish emotion. In the heat of action 
man thinks and feels but little. First deliberation, then 
action, then enjoyment. Thought, Volition, and Feeling are 
successively predominant though all co-exist. 

We invite you now to walk through this land of Spirits, 
bright, flitting Thoughts, beaming Emotions, and high-born 
Volitions by yourself. Your own soul lies open before you, 
enter its sacred precincts ; " know thyself." If this brief 
outline shall contribute to exciting a more general interest in 
the great science of Psychology, or aid the sincere inquirer 
in its study, it will have accomplished the purpose of its 
author. 

To refresh your mind after this rather dry dissertation, let 
me commend to you the following Traveler's Story, which 
will probably prove more interesting : 



A Traveler's Story. 55 



A TBAVELEK'S STOEY. 

PSYCEE-LAND AND "WHAT I SAW THERE. 



I HAD lived for many years in Real-land, turning here and 
there in pursuit of knowledge or pleasure, when I was 
induced to attempt a voyage of discovery into a neighboring 
realm, of which I had heard something all my life, but with 
which I had never sought to become familiar. For, like 
many others, I had been deterred by the many reports of the 
difficulty of access, the peculiarities of language, and the 
haziness of atmosphere which were said to prevail j^^ myste _ 
in that kingdom, and to be a source of much em- nous * 
barrassment and perplexity to a stranger. With regard to 
these difficulties I will only say that while I found them not 
entirely imaginary, they yielded to a great degree before 
patient and persevering effort; and while many attractive 
things by reason of the haze eluded complete exploration, 
yet I left even these with a hope of a clearer view upon some 
subsequent visit, and returned from my voyage with the con- 
sciousness that though my curiosity had not been satisfied, it 
had been rewarded by some very beautiful and noble views, 
and had been directed to subjects whose further investigation 
promised much of instruction and delight. 

Psyche-land, for such is the name of the country, attracts 
attention by the important part it plays in the f^g^ con . 
affairs of the world, notwitstanding the insignifi- H£ mn? ? ul Z 

7 o o 150 pounds of 

cant dimensions of its own peculiar territory ; but matter, mas- 
...... . . , ters the earth, 

more especially is it interesting as bems: the realm and is God's 
r . r . . ,° r .. peculiar care, 

of a sovereign of unique character and of peculiar 

relations to the King of Cosmos, usually called the Oreat 

King. 

3 



56 Outlines of Psychology. 

It seems that many years ago the Great King took a cer- 
tain very small district of Real-land, and having fitted it up 
in a most admirable manner with all kinds of conveniences 
for her especial use, installed a mysterious being named 

Psyche, a fairy-like goddess whom no profane eye 
The body the , J . . , ., , f., , 

home of the has ever looked upon, as the ruler of the realm. 

To her and to her kind, through all their genera- 
tions, it was given to control this district, called Body-land, 
and through it to make such conquests as she might be able 
in the surrounding country. And wonderful is the dominion 
which she has thus established. 

I had before explored to some extent this Body-land dis- 
trict, but now I determined to penetrate further- — to enter 
the capital of the county, Brain City by name, and to seek 
admission to the palace of Psyche herself, that I might learn 
what I could of the organization and administration of her 
government, the officers of her court, and the rules and proc- 
esses by which her affairs are conducted. 

BODY-LAND. 

The physical features of Body-land have been elaborately 
described by Coming and other investigators, and I need 
Physiologists on ly refer to them here. Its shape, a long strip, 
structure ^f bifurcated for the lower half part, and with two 
the body. outlying strips of smaller size projecting from the 
upper portion of the central continent, and showing various 
other details of conformation and outline, is well known to 
all my readers. Coming's description of this country is won- 
derfully interesting, showing a development and a perfection 
surpassing any other district of Real-land of which we have 
knowledge. In particular the wondrous system of telegraphic 
communication by which every portion of her territory is 
The nerves brought into instantaneous intercourse with Psyche 
andtheiruses. d eserves our attention. The whole country is 
permeated with a net-work of telegraph lines centering in 



V 



# 



< 



& 



ACTION 



*f. 



<U 



< 



-y 



x\V 



,\TY C . 



■* 



A 



£' 



«9 



WILL COURT. 



A Traveler's Story. 59 

Brain City. These lines not only automatically convey to 
Psyche notice of any assault from Real-land, or of the pres- 
ence of any foreigner, but also keep her constantly informed 
of the attitude and disposition of all her own officers and sub- 
jects, and communicate her orders to them all. Besides the 
universal and minute general information thus acquired, there 
are five posts in Body-land provided with special and accu- 
rate instruments, though of different character at each, for 
observing and reporting by their private telegraph lines 
special movements in Real-land. These are T h fl e 
called Taste Station, Touch Station, Sound Station, senses ten us 

- * all- we know 

Smell Station, and Sight Observatory, which is of the outer 

,,., n , world, 

situated in the highest part of the country, near 

Brain City, and has the instrument of greatest power and deli- 
cacy. There are no other means of communication with 
Psyche except through these telegraph lines. 

These numerous public and private telegraph lines all 
enter Brain City, the seat of Psyche's court, and Nerves give 
terminate at Sensation Circle, the exterior boundary tions. P our 
of her palace. All messages are in cipher, so San^the^S 
that no one but Psyche's telegraph reader, Mr. ™ lor ' sound » 
Perception, can understand them. 

PSYCHE'S COURT. 

When you enter Psyche's court you at once find yourself in 
a new and strange world, and one which it is difficult even 
to describe in the language of Real-land. Perhaps I may 
best give you an idea of its interior by the diagram of Brain 
City on opposite page. 

Three different kinds of operations are performed in 
Psyche's court, and for convenience in examination we have 
assigned to them separate apartments. The first of these is 



6o Outlines of Psychology. 



I. INTELLECTTION HALL. 

Here it is that all the facts and statistics about Real-land 
required in Psyche's court are gathered and digested for use. 
Thought the It is bounded by Sensation Circle, and gathers 
mental action, there all the cipher telegrams from Real-land. 

Some have reported that all that is in Intellectual Hall 

came originally from Real-land through Sensation Circle. 

. ,. But I must think otherwise. For when I sur- 
Innate ideas. 

veyed this Hall, under the guidance of a Mr. Con- 
sciousness, who seemed a very reliable and well-informed 
person indeed, I noticed particularly some things which could 
not have come from Real-land. Some of these were things 
which were not to be found in Real-land at all, or doctrines 
Points, lines, which were not true in Real-land, but which were 
fined mathe- indisputable here. I will mention only such 

matically, do , . ... . , , 

not exist in things as points, lines, angles, etc., and such state- 
not 'draw a ments as that the sum of the three angles of a 
breadth. triangle are equal to two right angles. Others 
were what one has called the optical instruments through 
which the movements in Sensation Circle are viewed ; 
concepts of such as Substance, Time, Space, and Cause, while 

Time, Space, , , , , , , . , ', 

Axioms of others are standards of measure by which the 

ards ' of the character and value of things reported to Psyche 

Beautifui,etc. through Sensation Circle are determined, as " The 
potentiallyin- TmQ „ 4C The Beautiful> » « ThQ Good> „ « The 

Right." 

I understand that Psyche's Sovereign gave her at least the 
pattern of these things and the capacity to make them 
when he put her in power, and that she formed them crudely 
the first time she had occasion for their use — probably in 
reading or testing some of the earliest telegraphic reports. 
They were, however, doubtless much improved, when I saw 
them, from their original form. That which appeared thus 
true in fact seems necessary in theory. For must not Psyche 



A Traveler's Story. 6i 

have of herself instruments for receiving and examining, and 
standards for measuring the things of Real-land, by which 
their relation to her own so different realm may be de- 
termined ? 

The officers of Intellection Hall are : 

Presiding Officer Prince Reason, Chief- Jus- Reason di- 
tice of Psyche's realm. 

Supervisor Consciousness, the best informed man in the 
kingdom, and a Sir Oracle as to its affairs. He is consciousness 
the highest authority in all questions as to the knows - 
matters of Psyche-land. 

Interpreter Perception, whose specific office it is to 
interpret the cipher telegraphic dispatches com- Mind reads a 
ing to Sensation Circle, and present them to the £ptic nerves! 
court. as co i° r ' e * c * 

Recorder Memory, who, as the general custodian of the 
records of Psyche's court, enters in a huge volume, marked 
Experience, all that occurs in Mr. Consciousness's presence. 
So systematic is Mr. Memory in his method of re- Memory can 
cording and indexing these almost innumerable Jjjjf^fljjjjjjj" 
items, that his two clerks, Messrs. Recollection 
and Remembrance, can, when properly stimulated to a per- 
formance of their duty, find the most minute records with 
wonderful facility. 

Artist Imagination holds a high rank, being ever ready 
to reproduce faithfully for Psyche's use any form or scene 
which Recollection or Remembrance may recite Imagina . 
from the records of Memory, or to delight the P \gt ur ^of 
court with creations of fancy of wonderful beauty, past and lu- 
He pictures, also, the path of the future to Psy- 
che, showing what possible acts Will may do, and portraying 
the consequences of each, and thus renders indispensable 
service to every department of Psyche's court. 

Commissioner Judgment, the quiet, sober business man 
of the court, whom you may observe sitting by the record of 



62 Outlines of Psychology. 

Experience, and measuring and weighing things brought 
we judge of to mm by the standards which Psyche furnishes, 
?y a our own an( ^ to which I have referred. You may hear him 
standards. at anv momen t announcing his decisions — " True," 
"Beautiful," M Good," " Right," "Taller," etc. 

All of the operations in Intellection Hall, and indeed 
throughout Psyche's palace, are performed with a prompt- 
ness, celerity, and accuracy which are simply marvelous to 
one accustomed only to the slow-paced movements of Real- 
land. Telegrams from Body-land and Real-land come to 
Sensation Circle every second, and oftentimes in overwhelm- 
ing crowds mingled together in what would seem inextrica- 
ble confusion. But with wonderful quickness they are re- 
ceived and interpreted by Perception, assorted, abstracted, 
classified, compared, and labeled by Judgment, filed away for 
future reference by Memory, reproduced by Recollection or 
Remembrance, and again painted forth as before, or in new 
combinations and relations, by Imagination, while such cases 
as require action are forwarded, after being made up in 
Reason's court, to Will court for decision. While I was look- 
ing on, and in much less time than it takes to tell it, a tele- 
gram came from Eye Observatory which read, as well as I 
could make it out at Sensation Circle, " Round, yellowish, 
vanishingly shaded," etc., etc. " Orange," cried Perception 
Attributes to ^ e court > supplying a noun for all these adjec- 
oniyareper- tives, as he looked through the instrument used 

ceived; the ' & 

concept of for such cases. Good for food," declared Tudg- 
substance in . , ,*>,»,, 

which they ment, applying the standard of the Agreeable, 

pureiyamen- whereupon Hunger, who was sleeping in the next 

corridor, and had a special telegraph line to 

Stomach Valley in Body-land, waked up and said " O ! " 

Emotions on- and immediately started a quick and impulsive 
ly exclaim. J *• r 

Desires move member °* tn e bar of Will court, called Desire- 
to action. for-Food, who, having the door invitingly opened 
by the page Hope, rushed into Will court and asked that 



A Traveler's Story. 6$ 

Deputy-Sheriff Hand be ordered to capture .Orange from 
Real-land and bestow it on Stomach Valley ; and although 
the method of procedure in Will court is quite w . 

complicated, as we shall presently see, and there siT % decide, 

. _ # _ _. ._ ftnci sx% 3. bout 

were in this case several consultations with Reason an object ai- 

most instan- 

court, and considerable argument between Mr. taneousiyand 
Desire-for-Food and Mr. Conscience, the Com- other things 
monwealth's Attorney, the whole matter was 
settled and the orange was captured and bestowed, as Desire 
requested, within three seconds after the report from Eye 
Observatory was received; besides which proper attention 
was given to several minor matters during the same brief 
period. 

H. SENSIBILITY COKEIDOK. 

Sensibility Corridor is the lobby (see diagram) where clients 
or their representatives meet the attorneys who practice at 
the bar of Will court. As the affairs both of Body-land and 
of Psyche's court are regulated by Sir Will's decisions, these 
each have representatives in Sensibility Corridor to tell of 
their condition and needs, and special attorneys to plead the 
cases of each in Will court. But as Sensation Circle is pe- 
culiarly situated, partaking of the nature of Body-land as well 
as of Real-land, there seems to be a necessity for a third 
class of representatives and attorneys to attend to these special 
interests. And so we find in Sensibility Corridor Emotions and 
representatives of three classes of clients and three ea^Kysffi 
corresponding classes of attorneys. The represent- chfcai"and 
atives of clients are known as Emotions, while P s y cnical - 
the attorneys constitute the very ancient and numerous family 
of Desires, which has secured for itself the monopoly of the 
legal profession in Psyche-land. 

Among the Body-land group of Emotions I noticed espe- 
cially gaunt Hunger, withered Thirst, tottering Physical emo- 

■xxt j x. j- -xt a,, • * tionsandde- 

Weakness, and bounding Vitality. Their at- sires, 
tending attorneys were a branch of the Desire family known 



64 Outlines of Psychology. 

as Appetites, as clamorous and importunate a crew as ever 
bothered a witness or badgered a jury. I must note also the 
presence among this group of some evidently foreign and, it 
is reported, illegitimate members of the family, who having 
gotten in by hook or by crook, and been admitted 
appetites oft- to the privileges of the Desire family as pleaders 
en strongest. ^ ^ ^ of wm court> nQt Qnly make themselves 

as much at home as any, but are actually more domineering, 
clamorous, and importunate than those born in the household. 
I will name especially Liquor-craving and Tobacco-cry. 

The representatives of Sensation Circle were of a less con- 
spicuous dress and more sedate demeanor. They constitute 
Pnysio-Psy- the second group of the Emotion family, and I 
tionsandDe^ noted only sprightly Cheerfulness, sad-faced 
sires. Melancholy, care-worn Anxiety, stolid Indif- 

ference, lively Interest, and languid Ennui. 

The members of the Desire family which give especial at- 
tention to cases from Sensation Circle are called Propensities, 
selfish Pro- some of which incline to favor Psyche in these 
pensions. complex cases, and others are more considerate of 
Body-land and of Real-land beyond. Among the former I 
was interested in observing one Curiosity, who peered 
around equipped with a magnifying glass and a bunch of 
skeleton keys, Acquisitiveness, with an iron chest, and 
Social Pro- Ambition, who seemed to be ever clutching after 
pensions. an i ma gi narv scepter. The latter and more 
liberal-minded section embraced such well-known friends of 
Real-land as scrupulous Imitativeness, politic Approbative- 
ness, and Veracity, a most engaging youth of frank, open 
face and clear and steady eye. 

Among the representatives of Psyche's court on the Emo- 
tion side of the corridor are sad-faced Sorrow, scornful Con- 
Psycnicai tempt, cankerous Envy, green-eyed Jealousy, 
emotions. an( j d ar k_browed, scowling Hate on the one hand, 
and on the other adoring Reverence, bright-faced Grati- 



A Traveler's Story. 65 

tude, Admiration, with parted lips, quiet Esteem, and 
queen among them all, Love, a maiden so entrancing that 
words fail to express her beauty and worth. It is Loveistoruie 
said, indeed, that she is related to the Great King, theSoul - 
a princess by birth, and that to educate her thoroughly and 
to establish her influence over Psyche is an object of great 
importance to him. 

The attorneys who represent Psyche-land in Will court are 
the ablest at the bar, and those which are employed by the 
well-favored Emotions are of imposing presence psychical 
and lofty eloquence. I mention only Mr. Patriot- Desires - 
ism, Mr. Benevolence, and Mr. Piety, whose pleadings 
have been known to lead Sir Will to deeds with Love of coun- 
which the world has rung — deeds such as made God. 
Leonidas, Florence Nightingale, and Paul immortal names. 

Three other personages attracted my attention, as of differ- 
ent dispositions from any I have named. Two of these, 
named Hope and Fear, are usually seen in company and yet 
opposed. As they have no cases of their own, these brief- 
less barristers meddled in nearly all the cases which came 
up, attaching themselves to the more fortunate attorneys re- 
tained, either to assist or oppose. Hope seemed to think it 
his business to open the door into Will court, and encourage 
the presentation of the plea, while Fear as persistently re- 
tarded all such movements. 

The third was a personage of dignified and commanding 

bearing, as if conscious of his noble ancestry, for he is a 

prince of the blood. He stood almost alone, for though his 

smile or frown contributes much to the comfort or disquiet 

of the rest, he has but one intimate companion. Moral Emo _ 

To him he is inseparably attached, and his cases tion accom- 

r J 7 . pames every 

he watches with ready sympathy, applauding his conscientious 

success and indignant at any decision of Sir Will 
against him. It is Mr. Moral Emotion to whom I refer, and 
his friend is Mr. Conscience, the Commonwealth's Attorney. 
3* 



66 Outlines of Psychology. 

The atmosphere of Sensibility Corridor must resemble that 
of the enchanted land, for all its inhabitants lie asleep or 
Feelings and nodding — the Emotions waiting to be aroused by 
Sroused'by messages through the wires, and the Desires, 
circumstances, lawyer-like, waiting for cases from clients, (which 
generally, if not always, come through the Emotions,) or col- 
Desires based lecting fees from them. The coin paid by the 
Sent'Emt Emotions seemed to be of three kinds, corre- 
tions. sponding to our copper, silver, and gold — Satisfac- 

tions, with which the appetites were paid off; Pleasures, which 
settled the salary of the higher-priced Propensities; and Hap- 
piness, the gold of Psyche-land. Of this the largest coins, a 
solid and weighty one called Peace, and a bright, shining one 
called Joy, seemed rewards worthy of the highest efforts of 
Messrs. Patriotism, Benevolence, and Piety. 

But these excitable Emotions, though they easily fall 
asleep, are very quickly wide-awake when any thing which 
concerns them is clicked over the wires. They will jump up 
in a second and cry " O ! " Ah ! " " Hurrah ! " and start a 
nimble attorney off with a case, though but a moment before 
you might have thought them sound asleep, or even dead. 
They are withal the only inhabitants of -Psyche-land who 
seem really to be enjoying themselves, for while the rest are 
busily employed these do nothing else than stimulate them 
to work and reward them for it, and every officer in Psyche- 
land, from Sir Will down, seems to be delighted to rouse 
them and listen to their expressions. To hear the " hurrah " 
of Vitality, the " ah ! " of Interest, the low-voiced 

To feel is tlie 

object of all murmur of Love, and the emphatic "well done " 
effort ' 

of Moral Approbation, are objects which Intellec- 
tion Hall and Will court unite to attain, while the clink of the 
coin of the realm — satisfaction, pleasure, and happiness — is 
charming to Psyche's ears. 

Above them all, radiant with royal beauty, is the Princess 
Love. Less reticent or exclusive than her brother, the 



A Traveler's Story. 67 

princely friend of Conscience, she smiles on all, and when 
her face beams with the royal light which betokens her origin, 
it fills all Psyche-land with heavenly radiance. 

We shall see more of our friends, the Desire family, now as 
we pass into Will court, where Prime Minister Will, clothed 
with all her authority, guides the affairs of Psyche's domain, 
and determines her fate and fortunes. 

III. WILI. COURT. 

The jurisdiction of this court extends to the entire realm 
of Body-land, and its authority is recognized and its orders 
obeyed by all the loyal officers of the palace also, so that all 
the movements of both presumably originate with it. Sir 
Will is hence the responsible head of Psyche's realm. But 
with regard to small details of customary cases, subordinate 
officers seem often to act in accordance with previous de- 
cisions of court, and apparently without referring Reflex motor 
to it for instructions. Moreover, I must say that Jo'n-voiun- 
the government of Psyche is not as perfect as it tary - 
should be, and that some of the stronger members of the De- 
sire family, nicknamed " Passions," and the less sober officers, 
as Mr. Imagination, do not seem to be very well under Sir 
Will's control, nor very obedient to his orders, and he, him- 
self, though perhaps able ultimately to subdue them, does not 
always insist upon his rights and compel obedience to his 
orders, but often modifies those orders and swerves from the 
strict line of right and justice and the highest good, to meet 
the caprices or appease the complaints of these rebellious 
subjects. 

Not only has Will court, or rather Sir Will, (for there is 
no jury,) supreme jurisdiction as indicated, but his ^ ctg f wm 
decisions are final in their sphere, and are only edatthe^day 
subject to revision by the King's Supreme Court of Jud £ ment - 
of Inquiry, at whose single session the entire record of the 
court will be examined, not with a view to reverse or alter 



68 Outlines of Psychology. 



its action, but to determine Psyche's standing with the King 
as a " good and faithful " viceroy. 

OFFICERS OF WILL COURT. 

The officers of Will court are : 

i. Sir William Will, Prime Minister of Psyche. His 
acts are recognized as Psyche's, and for them and their con- 
sequences, and these alone, Psyche, as viceroy, is held re- 
sponsible to the King. The justice of this will appear when 
you know that Psyche has, under the laws of the King, the 
Ben ewe d power to determine the character of this chief 
th ll3 r o u e gn" officer. The duty of this officer is to decide all 
Christ. propositions for action which may be brought be- 

fore him, and to issue all necessary orders to secure the 
action determined upon. 

2. The next officer is Counselor Conscience, the Com- 
monwealth's Attorney, whose special and only duty it is to 
demand and insist that the court shall decide all questions 

„ , J according to the facts in the case and the laws of 

Knowledge of & 

therisfttisan the King, as such facts and laws are certified to 

Intellection; & ' . 

approbation the court of Will by Prince Reason, who presides 

of a right act ._„..__„, , . 

an Emotion; in Intellection Hall, and to protest and give notice 

the demand . . . __. , _ . T . . ... 

thatthe right of appeal to the Kings Court of Inquiry in all 

true voice of cases of adverse decisions, while his bosom com- 
panion, Mr. Moral Emotion, always agreeing with 
his friend, publishes his satisfaction or dissatisfaction at the 
action of Sir Will in these cases. This assurance of approval 
or disapproval, coming from so august a personage as Coun- 
selor Conscience's inseparable companion, is not only in 
itself very pleasant or unpleasant to Psyche, as the case may 
be, but together with his own protest is regarded as an im- 
portant indication of the probable action of the King's Court 
of Inquiry, to which she may very naturally look forward 
with intense concern. For it must be observed that Coun- 
selor Conscience, being Commonwealth's Attorney, is the 



A Traveler's Story. 69 

representative of the Crown, and is supposed to reflect the 
wishes and demands of the King. This is the reason, I sup- 
pose, why he bears himself so haughtily, and dictates to Sir 
Will so imperiously, and sometimes goes to great lengths in 
his reproaches and upbraidings, especially after having been 
stimulated to the more zealous discharge of his duty by one 
of the communications from the King which he is frequent- 
ly receiving through messengers. But I am sorry conscience 
to say, that he often becomes very remiss, and if stirreYby^De 
very often crossed by Sir Will in any class of cases, Hol y s P irit - 
will cease to prosecute such cases, or to protest and appeal, as 
it is his duty to continue to do. Yet, even in such cases of 
indifference to duty, or in the yet more lamentable death-like 
stupor into which he has been known to fall from frequent 
ill-treatment, he is often aroused by messages from the King, 
and though he can do no more, protests most vigorously, and 
threatens Psyche with the condemnation and wrath of her 
Sovereign. 

In the discharge of his duty it is incumbent upon Counsel- 
or Conscience to require of Sir Will that he render no de- 
cision without having caused a careful examina- 

, . . . rr . , , Conscience 

tion into the facts and law affecting the case to nave requires us to 

cppir truth 

been made in Intellection Hall, and to protest in 
case such examination is omitted. 

Perhaps I have been too hard on Mr. Conscience for his 
frequent neglect of duty, considering the treatment to which 
he is subjected by the arbitrary Sir Will, who is, as you may 
judge, no great friend to such unservile attendant. What 

witli his frequent cruelties and the ill effects of 
. ..... ... . Conscience 

similar ill-treatment of his ancestors for genera- weakened by 

,, ._ . , . , , . past sins, 

tions past, Mr. Conscience s health is never per- 
fect, and often very poor indeed, so that we must lay most or 
all of his sins at last at Sir Will's door. Recognizing the 
situation of Mr. Conscience, the King's law has declared that 
Psyche will be held responsible for any injury done to the 



70 Outlines of Psychology. 

Commonwealth's Attorney by her Premier, and in case stupor 
or other insensibility is produced by his action so that Mr. 
Conscience cannot efficiently discharge his duties, she is held 
responsible for all acts contrary to the law, just as if Con- 
science had protested. Sir Will is so very headstrong, how- 
ever, and withal so prone to heed the suggestions of the 
aforementioned Passions, great enemies of Chief-Justice 
Reason and very intolerant of Mr. Conscience, that the latter 
nearly always bears marks of ill-usage, and is far less nimble 
than he should be. Favorable decisions, however, greatly 
improve Jiim, and frequent communications from the King 

««« fl »» mM stimulate his zeal and activity. When he is in his 
Conscience J 

the best best health, he is very dictatorial and exacting, 
and yet, when Sir Will is guided by his claims in 
all decisions, it is admitted by all observers, and Psyche her- 
self, that things go best in Psyche-land. 

But even under these most favorable circumstances there 
is another great difficulty to obtaining correct decisions in 
Will court. For Prince Reason, who ascertains and certifies 
to Will court the law as well as the facts, very often makes 
sad mistakes about both — woefully mistaking the law through 
Reason im- prejudice or ignorance, and also often misjudg- 
perfect j n g tne f ac t s . Against this, Will court has no 

remedy, except what may be secured by requiring of Reason 
a more careful investigation ; but let Reason do what he may, 
he finds it impossible, without help directly from the King, 
to give a perfectly correct statement of the law in all cases 
brought before him. 

This sad state of affairs, it is stated on the best of authori- 
ty, has not always existed ; for at first Reason could see and 
Effects of the perfectly apply the law, at which time Sir Will 
Fan. was j n sucn perfect accord with Chief- Justice 

Reason that he always decided at once in accordance with 
his statements, and Mr. Conscience had nothing to do. It is 
said, indeed, that at that time the King himself was in daily 



A Traveler's Story. 71 

communication with Psyche, and some say that only since 
that was interrupted — owing to her misconduct — has Mr. 
Conscience been installed as his active, actual Knowledge of 
representative. * But in a great disaster which oniy^e/the 
befell Psyche-land and Body-land, too, a long FaU - 
while ago, (I believe it was brought on by Psyche's trans- 
gressing the orders of the King, which disobedience was 
also the cause of the King's alienation,) Chief-Justice Reason 
and his attendants, Messrs. Judgment and others, along with 
all the officers of Psyche, were very seriously in- God's win 
jured, and to this the blindness and other infirmi- Naturef vol 
ties of Reason are to be attributed. It is, however, \\ ^^ b ^°J- 
announced in the royal law, (Vol. Ill, Part II, vol.111. 
passim,) that the Great Physician has prepared an eye-salve, 
called " Balm of Gilead," which Psyche may have free upon 

application, and which will remedy the defects of 

_ . ,. . , ,.._.. . Forgiveness 

Reason in reading the Jaw; and it is further de- through 

clared, that if this remedy is faithfully used Psyche 

will be forgiven for errors arising from any misjudgment of 

Reason. 

It was necessary, however, that reparation should be made to 

the King for the injuries already resulting from such errors 

and for other offenses, which would have left Psyche in a 

very distressing state (since she could not possibly have paid 

the penalty) had it not been for the unexampled generosity 

of the King's Son, who, feeling the deepest inter- 

. " , ' 1 , • , 1 , Redemption, 

est in Psyche, took her whole indebtedness upon 

himself, and at an inconceivable sacrifice and with incredible 
labor and suffering, not only paid all past demands in full, 
but deposited abundant resources to meet all similar penal- 
ties which she might incur in future, the whole being condi- 
tioned upon her acceptance of the King's laws and personal 
devotion to the King and his Son. 

I must add that the King often sends his special inter- 
preter to make plain the law, and that this helper sometimes 



72 Outlines of Pyschology. 

reads the law, even when the eye-salve is not used, and 

Holy Spirit reads it so loudly too, that it sets Mr. Conscience 
convinces of , „ . 

sin. agog, and creates a great commotion in Psyche- 

land generally. 

For the general injury to Psyche as well as to Body-land 
from the memorable disaster before referred to, there is no 

present remedy; none in fact, until the King 
Restoration l . J ±. . , . , , & 

through comes to settle up affairs ; but the damages result- 
ing to Body-land from Psyche's mistakes will ulti- 
mately all be repaired, while the very difficulties which beset 
her are turned to good account by the great Friend who has 
undertaken her cause. His tender affection for Psyche is 

The "Mar- well known, and rumors of a contemplated mar- 
riage of the . . , , 
Lamb." nage even are currently reported to have origi- 
nated in expressions of the Prince himself, the grand event 
to take place when Psyche shall have been rescued from all 
her difficulties and infirmities. 

This digression into the history and relations of Psyche 
has seemed to me necessary to render intelligible the mixture 
of qualities and conflict of efforts among the officers of Psy- 
che's court. 

3. The remaining officers require but brief notice. The 
records of Psyche's court, in all the departments, are in- 
trusted to Recorder Memory, whose functions have been 
already described. The decisions of Sir Will are, however, 
also recorded in a separate book marked "Character" and 
this book it is, which will be examined by the King's Court 
of Inquiry, at least so much of it as shall not have been 
changed or blotted out by the Prince, according to his pro- 
vision and law. Sheriff Muscle, who executes the tele- 
Muscie guid- graphic orders of Sir Will to Body-land, is always 
fonqu™ within call, though never in court, being an in- 
Nature. habitant of Body-land, and through him and the 

portions of Body-land which he summons to his aid, Psyche 
makes the most wonderful conquests in Real-land, especially 



A Traveler's Story. 73 

when Sir Will and Chief-Justice Reason are in harmony, so 
that the latter is allowed to supervise and direct the action 
of the sheriff a$d his posse. Of the dexterity and prompt- 
ness of these I might tell some wonderful tales, but I forbear. 

The attorneys practicing at the bar of Will court, besides 
Commonwealth's Attorney Conscience, are all members of 
the Desire family, native or adopted, and have been suffi- 
ciently described in our observations on Sensibility Corridor. 
These are all advocates of the Agreeable, while Conscience is 
ever the upholder of Law, which is the declaration of the 
Eight. The many contests between them are probably due 
to the general disturbance noted before; for I find Manoriginai- 
it laid down in the Constitution of Psyche-land , rP erfect 
that Conscience alone shall be allowed to plead on questions 
in which the statute law of the King is involved, Desires 
being debarred from all Conscience cases. The chief func- 
tion with which they were originally intrusted seems to have 
been to present cases to the court and move it to action, and 
before the disturbance occurred they had always moved in 
harmony with Reason and with the King's will, but I am told 
that it was chiefly through their impetuosity that 
Will was moved to the act which cost Psyche so Ambition 
dear. Were it not for the majesty and authority 
of Mr. Conscience, and the consequence which his position 
as the King's representative gives him, his voice would proba- 
bly be drowned in the clamor of these numerous and impetu- 
ous advocates. 

I was much gratified to find that the King's Son has under- 
taken to end the hostilities between this Desire family and 
Mr. Conscience, either by inducing them to sub- 

Dpsitp to T)p 

mit to his authority or by expelling them from made subject 
Psyche-land. But the plan adopted requires Sir 
Will's hearty co-operation, and as he has become quite at- 
tached to some of those who might have to leave, the happy 
consummation seems to be slowly approached, and Con- 



74 Outlines of Psychology. 

science has to struggle on with the majority of the Desires 
against him. These, then, constitute the bar. 

MODE OF PEOCEDUEE. 

Many sorts of cases are made up in Reason's court for 
Will to act upon, but none can come before him except upon 
the motion of one of these licensed attorneys. The 
without mo- work of Reason in preparing a case for Will court 
is about as follows: i. Interpreter Perception 
shows certain facts. 2. Commissioner Judgment ascertains 
their relations. 3. Artist Imagination suggests new combi- 
nations, and pictures two or more possible actions 
always before which Will may take. 4. These " Concepts of Pos- 
sible Action" drawn up by Imagination, are re- 
ferred to Commissioner Judgment for measurement by the 
three standards which he possesses for that purpose, which 
of a course are called The Right, The Useful, The Perfect. 
askf°^is ^it Reason then indorses upon each of these "Con- 
profltaWe, is cepts" the decisions of Judgment as to its relation 
it becoming?" to ^g three standards named, and the carefulness 
of its investigations being certified, the case is finally ready 
for presentation in Will court. 

When these alternative " Concepts " are taken up by dif- 
ferent members of the Desire family, and their contrary views 
are urged upon the court, Sir Will is sometimes hard put to it to 

decide. In many of these cases Conscience seems 
Someactsnot * . . 

apparently to take but little if any interest, either because of 
its own remissness or because Reason has not re- 
ported any positive decision as to the relation of the act to 
The Right, owing to the imperfections previously mentioned 
as existing in its operations. 

I should add, as an interesting fact, that Psyche herself has 
Faith tran- a telescope called "Faith," by which, in clear 
son. weather, she can see the signals from the King's 

palace, and that thus she often solves problems too deep for 



A Traveler's Story. 75 

Reason. Skill in the use of this instrument, accompanied by 
signals of distress and need, is known to lead to prayerbrings 
very great and valuable results. aid * 

TWO DISPUTED POINTS. 

Several very important questions have been discussed by 
observers of the action of Will court, about two of which I 
will give the conclusions to which my observation and in- 
vestigations have led me. 

First, it has been held that Sir Will, though apparently free 
and arbitrary in his actions, is really the servant or Freedom of 
the puppet of the various attorneys which practice thewm - 
at the bar of this court, as described, and in proof of this 
three arguments are presented : First, that he never _ 

. ".' - ,. Will, deter- 

acts except at the suggestion of one or more of mined by mo- 

these Attorneys or Motives, by which name the 

whole of these pleaders may be designated. Secondly, that 

he always does decide in accordance with the one which 

makes the strongest appeal, and hence it is argued he is 

"controlled by the strongest Motive," as they phrase it. 

Thirdly, that the decisions of Will in given cases, where the 

motives are known, can be forecast with much certainty, as, 

for instance, that a ripe orange belonging to Psyche's domain, 

will, at the request of Desire-for-food, Messrs. Reason and 

Conscience consenting, be bestowed upon Stomach Valley, 

showing that Sir Will is really controlled by Motives, so that 

knowing the motives we can often foretell the decision. 

But if I saw Sir Will aright, as seated upon the bench of 

a court deciding cases, it will be seen at once that it can very 

readily be admitted that he can take no action Mot i V es the 

until Motives, the attorneys at his bar, bring for- t£e^S£s!of 

ward a case for decision, and yet in his decision volitions - 

express only his own views and wishes. He cannot, it is true, 

decide unless he has something to decide ; but that fact does 

not cause him to decide either one way or the other. Motives 



76 Outlines of Psychology. 

thus are the occasions, the indispensable conditions, without 
which there would be no action at all, but they do not con- 
trol or determine Sir Will's decisions. 

The second assertion, that he always decides in accordance 
with the strongest motive, is both questionable as a fact, and 
it seems to me a " begging of the question " as an argument. 
I have seen Sir Will decide directly contrary to his own pre- 
vious decisions on the same subject, when not a 
Will arbitrary. . , . J ' r 

single new motive appeared to account for the 

change, and I have seen him decide against every plea which 
I perceived to be advanced by Motives, and act contrary to 
all, apparently just to assert and show his independence. 

But though it were claimed and conceded that this desire 
for independence is here the strongest Motive, yet it is ap- 
parent that a Motive has strength only as it pleases Will; an 
appeal that suits him, is strong ; one that does not, is weak ; 
and to say that he acts with the strongest, is simply to say he 
acts the way that suits him best. 

The third argument leads toward a proof, but does not 
lead to one. For though we can often we cannot always pre- 
dict the decisions of Will where all the Motives in the case 
are known, and if it were true that motives determine Will's 
decisions, we ought, when the case is known, to be able 
always, not sometimes only, to predict the decision upon it, 
and the same case would necessarily always be decided the 
same way, which we find is not done. So it is plain this ar- 
gument does not hold good. I think the fact that Will's de- 
cisions are often able to be predicted, is readily accounted 
for when we remember that, like most other judges, he is apt 
to follow his own precedents ; and if we have observed his 
decisions closely, so as to know his views and peculiar tend- 
encies, we can make a fair calculation as to his action in 
similar cases to those observed. But it is a matter of fact that 
we are often greatly disappointed in such calculations, be- 
cause Sir Will turns round and violates all his own prece- 



A Traveler's Story. 77 

dents, doing things which he never did before under the same 
circumstances. Hence he is very uncertain. 

That Will is the master, not the servant, of Motives, seems 
to me to be indicated by the fact that as judge he has the 
power to disbar ^any of the Motives, to refuse to listen to their 
appeals, and to stop the wrangling in any case and we can re- 
adjourn its decision to a future time, although to Motives. 
Desires all clamor for gratification. He can and often does 
refuse attention even to the facts and law as furnished by 
Reason and to the demands of Conscience, so that his actions, 
as far as I could see, are entirely self-originated. 

I asked Chief-Justice Reason what he thought of Sir Will's 
freedom in his action, and he replied that if Psyche's Prime 
Minister was not free then all the acts of the kingdom were 
forced upon her, and he could not for the life of Revelation of 
him see what was the use of his court having all ^hou^eS 
the laws in those three big books to study and ex- dom - 
plain, in order to show Will what he ought to do, if he was 
not free to do it when told. He added, moreover, that Com- 
missioner Judgment declared it monstrous to say that Psyche 
was held responsible by the King, and liable to punishments 
for the acts of Sir Will, if those acts were controlled by any 
outside parties without her knowledge or consent. 

As we were discussing the question, Mr. Consciousness 
(who is the Sir Oracle of Psyche) came up, to whom we will- 
ingly referred the matter for decision, whereupon, in his own 
emphatic way, and without " if" or " but," he said Free will a 
that he knew of his own personal knowledge, and consVious- 
had known it from infancy— in fact, ever since he ness * 
had known any thing— that Sir Will was absolutely free and 
arbitrary in his decisions, a statement which ended, with us, 
the discussion. 

"You will note, however," continued Mr. Consciousness, 
" that Sir Will by his decisions weaves for himself, to speak 
in a figure, the garment of habit ; (" for," remarked he quite 



78 Outlines of Psychology. 

facetiously, " since every coat is a habit, may not habit be 
called a coat ; ") weaves then this Habit, which, though in its 
Will bound earlier stages it is very flexible, comes to fit very 
by habit. tightly and to be very stiff and unyielding, so as to 
be much in Sir Will's way ; and though he may have or may 
acquire the power to tear it asunder at any stage and go out 
of the range of movement allowed by it, yet as a fact he does 
not very often do so ; so that if we observe closely the pat- 
tern and make of this garment as it is being woven, we may 
judge with great accuracy of the general character and limita- 
tions of Sir Will's subsequent acts. " O ! " said he, becom- 
ing quite serious and earnest, " it is a very, very important 
thing, the pattern of that garment." 

The second point upon which I would definitely express 
and reiterate an opinion which I have incidentally indicated 
already is this : By many if not by most explorers, Conscience 
has been thought to be possessed of the capacity to read the 
books of law for himself, and to make up his own cases, as 
well as argue them in Will court ; many going on to say that 
his decisions as to the right and wrong of an act (that is its 
conformity or non-conformity to the law) echo the voice of 
The term the King himself. But I am persuaded that Prince 

limited to the Reason is the decider of all questions in Psyche- 
imperative . . . J 
"do what land which require comparison. ' 1 hat the stand- 

is right." ard of Right is in the keeping of that court, as are 
the standards of The True and The Good, and indeed all 
others with which Psyche is supplied, and that the question 
whether this or that act is right, is decided by the same offi- 
cer who decides that this or that conception is beautiful, this 
or that act profitable. I find that these decisions of Reason's 
court are made the basis of Counselor Conscience's appeals, 
and that he never advocates that which Mr. Reason con- 
demns as wrong, and always demands of Will to do that 
which is by him certified as right. Hence it is that we can 
explain the many erroneous things which Conscience leads 



A Traveler's Story. 79 

Will to do, as arising from the wrong information as to what 
is right given him by Reason court, which error preceeds from 
the same infirmity of Reason noticed before as leading to so 
many mistakes in his other decisions, as to the true, the 
expedient, etc. To say that Counselor Conscience decides 
as to the rightness of individual acts, and then to affirm that 
this decision is the voice of the King, is to make conscientious 
the King responsible for many very contradictory due to the in- 
definitions of right and wrong. I find that the Reason, y ° 
whole function of Conscience is to urge Will, in the name and 
by the authority of the King, to do what Prince Reason has 
certified as right, and that Mr. Moral Emotion which attends 
him always expresses his views to Psyche when Prime Minister 
Will's decisions are or are not in accordance with the right 
as Reason states it, and that, too, regardless of any mistake 
which may afterward be discovered to have been made by 
Reason. Will is commended for his conformity to the right 
as determined by Reason at the time, and this commendation 
is never afterward withdrawn. 

That this does not provide for perfect action in Psyche- 
land is admitted, and hence the necessity for the eye-salve 
and other remedies provided by the Prince as mentioned here- 
tofore. 

Of the King's Court of Inquiry I could ascertain but little 
from Psyche's officers. They seemed, however, to feel that 
its scrutiny would be unbearable but for the friendship of the 
King's Son and the work which he has done ; that it will only 
review the Conscience cases in Will's record, T b e judg- 
that is, those in which the law was involved, ment * 
though some do say, and with great show of reason, that every 
act of Will is a Conscience case, claiming that the Responsibm- 
law has to do with all his decisions. Psyche be- to light, 
lieves that judgment will be given on Sir Will's action accord- 
ing to the facts before hin in each case, and his care in 
requiring Reason to ascertain all the facts possible before 



80 Outlines of Psychology. 

he decides a case ; and that where the last volume of the law 
has not been placed before Reason, the case will be decided 
according to the laws written in Volumes I and II, a view 
which seems authorized by Volume III itself. (Rom. ii, 12-15.) 

A CASE TEIED AND DECIDED. 

I will conclude by describing the conduct of a case which 
originated and was decided in my presence, that you may 
gather up this long description of Psyche-land in a single ex- 
ample of the operations of its court. 

Perceiving a stir in Sensation Circle, I looked and saw a 
message from Ear-gate, "vibration, k, 1, 30,000, do. 3,000, do. 
21,000, shhhs, pop," etc., etc., etc. "Sound of something 
bursting," quickly cried Perception, for he knew how to read 
Ear-gate's cipher. But just as he said this there came a 
telegram from Eye-tower : " Shooting, up, up, up, flash, peo- 
ple." I could make nothing out of it until astute Perception 
said : "Another message about the same thing — people send- 
ing up fire-works." Then followed, under the supervision of 
Reason, a deal of rapid calculation and work of various sorts 
by Judgment, Recollection, Imagination, and others in Intel- 
lection Hall, and very quickly Consciousness, looking at a 
paper upon which Imagination had drawn a few rapid 
strokes, called out " Concept of self united with people look- 
ing on." Thereupon Excitement started up on the emotion 
side of Sensibility Corridor, and looking at the " concept " 
nudged Mr. Desire-to-see, on the other side, who being 
awakened, seized the paper, and rushing into Will court with 
it, asked for an immediate order on Sheriff Muscle to move 
Body-land toward the fire-works. Thereupon Mr. Conscience, 
who was much more sedate in his movements, arose and 
asked whether Mr. Desire-to-see had brought into court all 
the facts and the law in the case from Reason court. Mr. 
Desire-to-see had to confess that he had been in such a hurry 
that he had run off with the " Concept of self united with 



A Traveler's Story. 8i 

people looking on," drawn by Imagination, before Reason had 
indorsed her statement of the law and facts upon it. The 
brief having been returned for these, came back with the fol- 
lowing indorsements: i. Facts and Judgment — (i.) To see 
will be pleasant, enlivening, beneficial to body if not con- 
tinued too long. * (2.) Lessons to be prepared leave only one 
hour for amusement. (3.) This concept is not contrary to 
the Law. 

Upon this statement of the facts and law, Desire-to-see re- 
newed his appeal, claiming that the action he desired was in 
accordance with the facts and the law, as stated by Reason, and 
that even his old opponent, Mr. Conscience, could surely find 
nothing to say against it. Whereupon, Mr! Conscience, con- 
gratulating Mr. Desire-to-see upon happening to be on good 
ground, and twitting him with having taken his side before 
he knew Reason's decision, said that he had no objection to 
the proposed action, and indeed would join with his facile 
friend in urging it, unless Reason could suggest some better 
occupation for the hour, upon which point he insisted that 
Reason should be again consulted. This was done, to the 
great apprehension of Mr. Desire-to-see, but Reason not sug- 
gesting any thing better, Conscience and Desire both rested 
the case, the former only saying that he should insist on the 
order being strictly in accordance with the facts, that Sheriff 
Muscle should carry body to the spot, and after one hours 
amusement, should return it to other duty. Desire-to-see 
did not seem to like this particularity of Mr. Conscience, but 
well knowing that Reason would be against him if he referred 
to him the question of return, he submitted. Sir Will, after 
a moment's hesitation, decided the question in favor of the 
proposition as stated by Mr. Conscience, which started Moral 
iVpproval, Anticipation-of-Pleasure, and other Emotions to 
animation in the adjoining corridor. An order was at once 
issued by telegraph to Sheriff Muscle, and in a moment more 
he was hurrying body off toward the throng. Whether he 
4 



82 Outlines of Psychology. 

brought it back at the appointed time I cannot say, but I 
noticed a sly smile on Desire-to-see's face which made me 
think he hoped to trick old Mr. Conscience yet, and at least 
expected to get Sir Will to re-open the question of return at a 
more auspicious moment. At any rate Consciousness re- 
ported the whole transaction to Memory, and it was recorded 
in " the Book of the Acts of Will "and went to make up the 
volume of " Character," and a thread was woven in the gar- 
ment of Habit. 

And so every day and hour is the book of our character, 
and the Habit which shall fit around our Will being com- 
pleted, and his decisions being entered up for adjudication at 
the great day of Accounts. 



THE END. 



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